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INTEREST RATES of all maturities  have tended to increase in the past few 
years when the level of the MI measure  of the money stock announced 
on Fridays  has been unexpectedly  large.  Conversely,  interest  rates  have 
tended  to fall when the announcement  has been surprisingly  small.  Even 
very long-term interest rates, such as thirty-year  government bond 
yields, respond  to the money surprises.  The response  of short-  and  long- 
term  interest  rates has been sufficiently  dramatic  to attract  considerable 
attention  from  market  analysts  and  academic  economists.  ' 
We acknowledge  helpful  discussions with Dale Ballou, Paul Boltz, Carlos  F. Diaz- 
Alejandro,  Robert  L. Hetzel, Kenneth  Kopecky,  William  C. Melton,  William  D. Nordhaus, 
V. Vance Roley, Steve Ross, and participants  in seminars  at Yale, the University of 
Pennsylvania,  and the National Bureau of Economic Research. We also thank Data 
Resources, Inc., Salomon Brothers, Money Market Services, Inc., and the Federal 
Reserve Board  for providing  data. This research  was supported  by the National  Science 
Foundation  under  grant  SES-8105837. 
1. See Bradford  Cornell,  "Money  Supply  Announcements  and  Interest  Rates:  Another 
View," Journal of Business,  vol. 56 (January  1983),  pp. 1-23; Charles  Engel  and  Jeffrey 
A. Frankel, "Why Money Announcements  Move Interest  Rates: An Answer from the 
Foreign  Exchange  Market,  " Working  Paper  (University  of California  at  Berkeley,  January 
1982);  Donald  A. Nichols, John  H. Small,  and  Charles  E. Webster,  "Why  Interest  Rates 
Rise When  An Unexpectedly  Large  Money Stock Is Announced,"  American Economic 
Review,  vol. 73 (June 1983),  pp. 383-88;  V. Vance  Roley, "The Response  of Short-Term 
Interest  Rates  to Weekly  Money  Announcements,  " Working  Paper  1001  (National  Bureau 
of Economic  Research,  October  1982);  and  Thomas  Urich  and  Paul  Wachtel,  "The  Effects 
of Inflation  and  Money  Supply  Announcements  on Interest  Rates"  (New York  University, 
Graduate  School  of Business, August 1982). 
173 174  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
In the same  period  there  has been a general  perception  that  long-term 
interest  rates have been "too high." What  seems to be meant  by this is 
that long-term  rates are unusually high given the recent behavior of 
short-term  interest rates (and other variables, such as inflation,  which 
may affect long-term  rates). We confirm  that long-term  rates in the past 
two years have been substantially  higher  than those predicted  using a 
term-structure  equation  like those commonly  found  in macroeconometric 
models.2 
We are concerned in this paper with basic methods of interpreting 
these and similar  term-structure  phenomena.  Our  purpose is to deter- 
mine  whether  a simple  theory, without  major  modification,  can be used 
to explain the observed behavior of  longer-term  yields. The most 
important  of such "simple theories" is the expectations theory of the 
term structure,  which confines attention  to the forecasting  process for 
short-term  interest  rates. 
The  expectations  model  has  been used as a workhorse  for  many  policy 
discussions. While practitioners  have incorporated  risk factors in the 
form  of a constant  or even a slowly moving  risk  premium,  they have not 
focused on changes in risk as the primary  interpretation  of interest  rate 
phenomena. Thus changes in the shape of the term structure  are still 
understood  to reflect  a changed  outlook  for future  interest  rates relative 
to current  rates. According  to the model, even though  policy authorities 
can accurately  control short-term  rates, the authorities  affect long-term 
rates only insofar  as they influence  a long weighted  average  of present 
and  expected future  short-term  rates. 
The simple expectations theory, in combination  with the hypothesis 
of rational  expectations, has been rejected  many times in careful  econ- 
ometric  studies.3  But the theory seems to reappear  perennially  in policy 
2. See table 2. The equation  is similar  to the one estimated  in Modigliani  and Shiller, 
which  has  since  been  used  as a structural  equation  in  the  MIT-Pennsylvania-Social  Science 
Research  Council  (MPS)  model  of the United  States  economy. See Franco  Modigliani  and 
Robert  J. Shiller, "Inflation,  Rational  Expectations  and the Term Structure  of Interest 
Rates," Economica,  vol. 40 (February  1973),  pp. 12-43.  Their  equation  was motivated  by 
the  idea  that  distributed  lags  on short-term  interest  rates  and  inflation  rates  might  represent 
expectations  of the long-run  path  of future  interest  rates. 
3. For example, Lars Peter Hansen  and Thomas  J. Sargent,  "Exact Linear  Rational 
Expectations  Models: Specification  and Estimation,"  Staff Report  71 (Federal  Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis,  September 1981);  Richard  Roll, The Behavior  of Interest Rates 
(Basic  Books, 1970);  Thomas  J. Sargent,  "A Note on Maximum  Likelihood  Estimation  of 
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discussions  as if nothing  had  happened  to it. It is uncanny  how resistant 
superficially  appealing  theories in economics are to contrary  evidence. 
We are reminded  of the Tom and Jerry cartoons that precede feature 
films  at movie theatres.  The villain,  Tom the cat, may be buried  under  a 
ton of boulders,  blasted  through  a brick  wall (leaving  a cat-shaped  hole), 
or flattened  by a steamroller.  Yet seconds later he is up again  plotting 
his evil deeds. 
Apparently  those who are interested  in practical  policy discussions 
believe there is an element of truth  to the theory that survives all the 
attacks. Our major objective here is to help the reader formulate  an 
opinion  about  the usefulness of the simple  expectations  model. For this 
purpose we compare  the model with an alternative,  which we call the 
"tail-wags-dog"  theory. This says that long-term  interest rates may 
overreact  to information  relevant  only to short-term  rates.4 
In the following section we develop a linear  analytical  framework  in 
which the simple expectations model of the term structure can be 
embedded. Linear approximations  have long played a pivotal role in 
studies  of the term  structure.  Nonetheless, such linearized  models  have 
never been given a complete and unified development. We take the 
opportunity  here to fill this void by deriving new general linearized 
expressions for forward  rates and holding-period  yields. We examine 
the accuracy  of the linearized  expressions  for the recent  period  of higher 
interest  rate volatility. Since the linearization  effectively assumes that 
"duration"  (defined  below) is constant, we also look at the effects of 
changing  duration  on the predictive  power  of a term-structure  equation. 
We go on to evaluate  the linearized  expectations  model as a descrip- 
tion of the observed behavior  of interest rates and attempt  to improve 
vol 5 (January  1979),  pp. 133-43, and "Rational  Expectations  and the Term  Structure  of 
Interest Rates,"  Journal of Money,  Credit and Banking, vol. 4 (February 1972), pp. 74- 
97; and  Robert  J. Shiller,  "The Volatility  of Long-Term  Interest  Rates  and Expectations 
Models  of the Term  Structure,"  Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol. 87 (December  1979), 
pp. 1190-1219. 
4.  Such a theory has been proposed in Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, 
"Judgment  under Uncertainty:  Heuristics and Biases," Science, vol. 185 (September 
1974),  pp. 1124-31.  In  summarizing  experiments  by  psychologists,  Tversky  and  Kahneman 
stated  that  subjects  showed  "insensitivity  to reliability  of the  evidence"  and  "unwarranted 
confidence"  in  their  predictions.  Predictions  were  made  based  on "representativeness"  or 
similarity,  with little  regard  for statistical  evidence. The authors  thought  the experiments 
suggested  that "even when predictability  is nil," investors  would  react  to "information 
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on this model  by taking  account  of time-varying  risk  premiums.  Finally, 
we use the linearized expectations model to interpret  the effects of 
money-stock announcements  on long-term  bond rates. The linearized 
model enables us to specify more  accurately  than  has been done before 
how the effect of money surprises  is distributed  across forward  rates at 
various  horizons  and maturities.  In addition,  the model allows us to ask 
whether  the response of forward  rates has been appropriate  or whether 
the market  has over- or underreacted  to the announcements.  Thus we 
can compare the simple expectations theory with a model of the tail- 
wags-dog  variety  in which  long-term  rates  overreact  to money  announce- 
ments. 
A Linearized Model of the Term Structure of Interest Rates 
The basic notion that long-term  interest  rates are related  to expecta- 
tions of future short-term  interest rates has presented model builders 
with some technical difficulties.  We outline here a way of dealing  with 
these difficulties  that has the advantages  of simplicity,  generality,  time 
consistency, and direct applicability  to familiar  data. The approach, 
which is a generalization  of earlier  work, consists of linearized  approxi- 
mate  expressions  for  holding-period  yields  and  forward  rates  and  a model 
that relates these linearized  expressions.' The approach  is intended  to 
be the simplest possible general formalization  of the various intuitive 
ideas we regularly  use to interpret  interest  rate data. 
Expectations theories of the term structure  of interest rates have 
several  basic  forms.  In  one form,  long-term  interest  rates  are  represented 
as an average of expected future short-term  interest rates. In another, 
forward  rates  equal  the expectations  of the corresponding  future  interest 
rates. Forward rates, defined formally below, are the future interest 
rates implicit  in the term structure  on a given date. In yet another  form, 
expected short-term  holding period yields of long-term  bonds equal 
today's short-term  interest rate. The holding-period  yield, also defined 
formally  below, is the total return  (coupon and capital  gain) to buying 
a long-term  bond and then selling at the end of the holding  period. The 
5. For earlier  work see Shiller, "The Volatility  of Long-Term  Interest  Rates," and 
"Alternative  Tests of Rational  Expectations  Models:  The Case of the Term  Structure," 
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technical problem  that has confronted  model builders  is that, if mathe- 
matical  expectations  are  taken  to represent  market  expectations,  so long 
as there  is uncertainty  about  future  interest  rates  these models  contradict 
each other. Moreover, none of the models is time consistent-that  is, 
independent  of the time  period  chosen for analysis.  This  problem,  which 
has to do with "Jensen's inequality," is described by Cox, Ingersoll, 
and Ross.6 Our approach  approximates  all the models by one simple 
time-consistent  model. 
Our approach here is more practically  oriented than that of most 
theorists who have considered the modeling  difficulties.  We want our 
model to apply  to yield data as it is conventionally  reported  rather  than 
to the returns on the "pure discount" bonds that are analyzed by 
theorists. Actual bonds with maturities  beyond one year almost  always 
carry  coupons that, for longer  maturities,  account  for most of the value 
of the bond. The yields of these bonds  cannot  be compared  with  the pure 
discount  forward  rates computed  by McCulloch  and others.7 
To understand  the importance  of coupons, one should consider our 
first  version of the expectations  model, which sets the long-term  rate  as 
an average  of future  short-term  rates. The standard  linearized  expecta- 
tions  model  for  discount  bonds  expresses  the  yield  on an  i-period  discount 
bond  as an unweighted  average  of expected  future  yields on i one-period 
discount  bonds. This  model  can  be described  as having  a "flat"  weighting 
scheme. The model we outline below for coupon bonds expresses the 
yield on an i-period coupon bond as a weighted average of expected 
future  one-period  rates, with  rates  further  in the future  given  less weight. 
The reason for this declining  weighting  scheme is that part  of the value 
of a coupon bond is derived  from  coupon  payments  that will be made  in 
the near future. The coupon bond can be considered as a package of 
discount bonds, only one of which has the full maturity  of the coupon 
bond. 
Our  model is written 
(1)  R,i)  =  E 
W(k)EtR MO  k=O 
6. John Cox, Jonathan  E. Ingersoll, and Stephen A. Ross, "A Re-examination  of 
Traditional  Hypotheses  about  the Term  Structure  of Interest  Rates,"  Journal  of Finance, 
vol. 36 (September  1981),  pp. 769-99. 
7. J. Huston  McCulloch,  "Measuring  the Term  Structure  of Interest  Rates,"  Journal 
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where  W(k) =  gk(l  -g)I(1  -  gi), 0 <  g  <  1. Here, Rfi) is the yield to 
maturity  on an i-period  bond at time t; Et denotes mathematical  expec- 
tation  conditional  on publicly  available  information  at time t; W(k)  (k = 
0,..  ., i -  1)  are weights;  and  g is a constant  discount  factor.8  We write 
the discount rate associated with it as R; then g  =  1/(1 +  R).  For 
expositional  simplicity,  we have left out any risk  premium,  although  we 
modify  this equation  for empirical  work  by adding  to the right-hand  side 
a risk-premium  term, Vi,  which  depends  only on i and  which  is constant 
through  time.9 With this simplification  the i-period  rate is a weighted 
average of expected one-period  rates. As described intuitively  above, 
the weights decline monotonically  in k and sum to 1.0 [W(O)  +  W(1) + 
*  +  W(i  -  1)  =  1]. The  weighting  structure is  of  the  truncated 
exponential or truncated  Koyck variety. For large k (very long-term 
bonds)  the truncation  is so far in the future  that  we can disregard  it, and 
for perpetuities  (i = infinity),  there  is no truncation. 
Equation 1 can most easily be understood by use of Macaulay's 
concept of duration,  which is intended  as a better  measure  than  the time 
until maturity  of how "long" a bond is.10  The duration  of an i-period 
bond, which pays a coupon each period, with yield to maturity  R is 
defined  by 
Di=  (gci  +  2g2c,  +  *  +  igic,  +  igi)1(gc,  +  g2c,  +  *  +  gic,  +  gi), 
where g  =  1/(1 +  R), ci is the coupon rate of the bond (as a fraction  of 
the principal  repaid  at maturity),  and  the denominator  is the price  of the 
bond as a fraction  of par. Thus the duration  of a pure discount  bond is 
its time until maturity  but the duration  of a coupon bond is less than its 
time to maturity,  reflecting  the coupon payments  that are made  earlier. 
The higher  the level of interest rate for a given maturity  i the more the 
future  is discounted  and thus the shorter  is the duration.  We speak here 
8. As in Shiller,  "The  Volatility  of Long-Term  Interest  Rates,"  and  "Alternative  Tests 
of Rational  Expectations  Models." In the expressions  in the text, interest  rate is quoted 
as a rate  per period,  not percent.  Thus,  for example,  if the time  period  is monthly  and  the 
one-year  Treasury  bill rate is 6 percent,  then  RF'2)  = 0.005. In the tables, however,  rates 
are percent  per year. In all expressions  parentheses  are used to distinguish  superscripts 
from  exponents. 
9. The constant risk premium  is from Hicks. See J. R. Hicks, Value and Capital 
(Oxford:  Clarendon  Press, 1939). 
10.  Frederick R. Macaulay, Some Theoretical Problems Suggested  by the Movements 
of Interest Rates,  Bond Yields, and Stock Prices in the United States Since 1856 (National 
Bureau  of Economic  Research, 1938). R. J. Shiller,  J.  Y. Campbell,  and K. L. Schoenholtz  179 
of the duration  of an i-period  bond as that of a par  bond of maturity  i- 
that is,  a bond whose coupon rate, ci, is R.  Then from Macaulay's 
formula with ci =  R we have 
(2)  Di =  (1 -  gi)l(l -  g)  O  c  i. 
It follows that the model in equation 1 makes the i-period  yield, R(i)t 
equal to the present value, discounted  by R, of future  one-period  rates 
over the maturity  of the bond  divided  by the duration  Di. 1I  Alternatively, 
equation 1 may be described as setting the i-period rate equal to a 
duration-weighted  average of expected future interest rates of any 
maturities  that  cover the period  from  t to t + i. 
The above model  is a good approximation  to the various  expectations 
models of the term structure  if interest rates are not so variable that 
nonlinearities  become important.  That is, we suppose RW  lies in the 
vicinity of R for all i and t and that the bonds carry  coupons in periods 
t +  1, t +  2, . .  .,  t +  i at a rate (coupon over principal), ci, which is in 
the vicinity  of R. We denote aj-period  holding  yield  for an i-period  bond 
(i > J) as Hfi-J).  This is the yield (expressed as a rate per period) from 
buying an i period bond at time t and selling it at time t + j when the 
bond has become an i  -  j  period bond. The holding-period  yield is 
computed as the yield to maturity  of an asset for which one pays the 
price of an i-period  bond at time t, receives the coupons of the i-period 
bond, and is finally  paid the principal  at time t + j (the principal  being 
the price of the bond at time t + j). The holding-period  yield depends, 
therefore, on ROl),  RKi+J),P  and the coupon on the bond. However, if the 
implicit  expression for Hfi-')  is linearized  around  R for all arguments  of 
the expression-in  other  words, if we take a Taylor  expansion  of Hti  j)  in 
terms  of R?), RKi)JJA,  and ci around  R truncated  after  the linear  term-we 
obtain  a simple  approximate  holding  period  yield, 
=DiR)  -  (Di -  Dj)RyiVy)  (3)  h~~J)  =  0 <j 
where Di and Dj are the i- and  j-period durations  given by equation  2. 
Note that  the coupon rate drops  out of the expression  altogether.  In the 
11. The mean  of the distribution  W(k)  defined  in equation  1  is g/(l  -  g) -  ig/(l  -  gi). 
For large i this mean is approximately  equal to Di -  1.0. The difference  of 1.0 arises 
because  the summation  in equation  1  is from  zero to i -  1  rather  than  from 1  to i. For  small 
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implicit formula for holding-period  yields the coupon effects are of 
second order. Also note that equation  3 is homogeneous  of degree 1 in 
R't)  and  RKi+-J),  that  is, the constant  term  drops  out of the expression.  This 
expression generalizes those that have been obtained in earlier  work. 
When the holding period is one period long (j  =  1), the expression 
reduces by substitution  of equation 2 into 3 to that in Shiller.12 As R 
approaches  zero the bonds become discount bonds, Di approaches  j, 
and  we obtain 
-  i  -  (j)  R (i 
hfi  i) =  i Ryi)  -  i  j  t  tJ 
The m-period  forward  rate  applying  to period  t + n is computed  from 
the term structure  of interest  rates at time t. If we can both borrow  and 
lend at the rates given in the term structure,  it is possible to arrange  a 
portfolio  that guarantees  for us a price of a bond at time t + n maturing 
at time t +  m  +  n. The procedure is to buy at time t an m  +  n period 
bond and to issue bonds of maturities  1, 2, 3, ...  , n so that the total 
value of the portfolio  at time t is zero, and so that  the value of the stream 
of payments on issued bonds exactly equals the coupon received on 
the m  +  n period bond over all intervening  periods, t +  1, t +  2, ... 
t + n -  1. The net effect, then, will be to lock in a contract  to lend at 
time t +  n, receive coupons from t +  n +  1  until t +  m + n, and be paid 
back att  +  m +  n. 
The yield to maturity  on this m-period  loan will be called  the n-period 
ahead,  m-period  forward  rate, Fn, m).  This  forward  rate  can be computed 
from R(m+n)  and R(1")  as well as all other rates, R  ,  .  .  .,  R("- 1), and 
coupons, cl,  c2,  .  .  .,  cn,,  cn, C,i+m,  of the various  bonds. If, however, 
one linearizes  the complicated  implicit  expression for the forward  rate 
around R  for all the arguments, a simple linearized approximation, 
f  nm)  to the forward  rate, F;n,  m), results  in 
(4)  n,rn)  Dm  +  -D  0 < m, 0  n, 
D7n  + 11  Dn 
where Dm+n  and Dn are durations of bonds maturing in m  +  n periods 
and n periods, as given by equation  2. This expression  depends  only on 
Rftm  +n)  and Rin),  and not on Ri 1) Ri2) ,  .  .  .,  9Ri11-  1)  , nor on cl, C2, .  .  .,  Cn -  ,, 
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Cn cn  + m. The effect of these yields and  coupons  is again  of second order 
and drops out of a linearization. Note also that when m =  1, so that the 
forward rate is a one-period  rate, by using equation 2 this expression 
reduces to that in Shiller.13  As R approaches  zero,  the bonds become 
discount bonds,  Dm  +  n approaches  m  +  n, D,, approaches  n, and we 
obtain 
f(,nr)  (m + n)R0't'l+)  -  nRi'I  0 < m, 0 ?  n, 
m 
which for m =  1 is the conventional  linear approximation. 14 
The model in equation 1 then implies 
(5)  Ethfti  = R,j  O  <;  <  i 
(6)  f(n  m)  =  EtR(%),  0 < m, 0 ?  n. 
Thus the expected  linearized holding-period yields  on all bonds for all 
holding intervals are equal to the corresponding spot rates; and linearized 
forward rates for all future time periods  and all maturities equal the 
corresponding  expected  spot  rates.  Moreover,  either equation  5 or 6 
implies equation 1-that  is, subject to the linearizations of forward rates 
and holding-period yields,  all versions of the expectations  theory of the 
term structure can be reconciled. 
Of course, knowing the quality of the linear approximation is important 
in judging how well the models  have been unified by the linearization. 
The recent increased variability of interest rates has slightly diminished 
the accuracy of the linearization. Table 1 shows some data on the quality 
of approximation over the recent period of volatile  interest rates. The 
point of linearization is generally the mean level  of interest rates over 
the sample period, but in rows 4 and 6 it is varied to the minimum and 
maximum of the three-month Treasury bill rate over the sample.  15 This 
change has little effect on the one-year ahead, one-year forward rate or 
13. Shiller,  "Alternative  Tests of Rational  Expectations  Models." 
14.  For example,  see Roll, The Behavior of Interest Rates. 
15. It might  be thought  desirable  to linearize  around  the current  level of the long-term 
interest  rate at each moment  of time. This would  produce  closer approximations  to true 
holding-period  yields or forward  rates. But such an approach  is not compatible  with a 
linear  time-consistent  expectations  model  of the term  structure.  Therefore  we work  with 
a time-invariant  point of linearization  throughout  this paper,  although  the point chosen 
does depend  on the particular  sample  period. 0 
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the accuracy  of the linearization.  It has somewhat  greater  effect on the 
linearized  twenty-year  ahead,  ten-year  yield.  16 
One important  implication  of equation  6 for our purposes  is that the 
sequence  of  linearized  forward  rates,  (fin,  m),f(n 
- 
1ml),fin-  2,m)  R(m)) 
is a martingale,  that  is, each element  in the sequence  equals  the expected 
value conditional on information  at that time from the subsequent 
element. However, contrary to a popular misconception, the theory 
does not imply  that  long-term  interest  rates themselves are martingales 
or random  walks. That  is, the bond rate today in general  does not equal 
today's  expectation  of the bond  rate  in  future  periods.  The  term  structure 
contains  a prediction  of change  in the long-term  rate, and in fact in this 
paper  we use the predicted  change  to test the expectations  theory. 
The martingale  property of forward  rates implies that the change, 
f(n,n)  -  fin-s,m),  over any time interval, s, of linearized  forward  rates 
applying  to a particular  time, t + n, should  depend  only on information 
available  between t and t + s and not on information  available  before t. 
If both s and n are very small relative to m, then  f(n,m)  -  finj  -sm)  is 
approximately the same as R(m) -  Rim). Hence  the model does  imply 
that over very short intervals long-term  bond rates are approximate 
martingales,  and  that  it may  be appropriate  to test the model  by regressing 
changes  in interest  rates  over very short  intervals  on lagged  information. 
Because of the martingale  property,  the m-period  interest  rate  can be 
regarded  as the sum  of uncorrelatedrandom  variables,  which  are  changes 
in forward  rates. Thus 
R';m)  =  (R'tm)-  ffl,m))  +  (fftlm)  - f(2,m))  +  (ff2q)  -  f3,mt))  + 
According  to the expectations  theory, if some information  variable  such 
as the money-supply  announcements  can explain changes in forward 
rates  well, it can explain  interest  rates also. If a particular  money-stock 
announcement  has an effect on forward  rates on a given day, we do not 
expect the subsequent  changes  in forward  rates  to offset this impact. 
It is easier  to test whether  the money-supply  announcements  have an 
effect than  to test whether  any effect is subsequently  offset. By concen- 
16. Varying  the point  of linearization  is equivalent  to altering  the assumed  duration  of 
long-term  bonds. Ando and Kennickell  have recently  emphasized  that the change  in the 
level of interest  rates has altered  the duration,  and thus the behavior,  of long-term  rates 
given  the  path  of expected  future  short-term  rates.  See Albert  Ando  and  Arthur  Kennickell, 
"A Reappraisal  of the  Phillips  Curve  and  the  Term  Structure  of Interest  Rates"  (University 
of Pennsylvania,  1983).  We use the linearized  model  to evaluate  this argument  below. C0 
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trating  on a very small  interval  of time, s, such as one day during  which 
a money-supply  announcement  is made,  it is possible  to form  a powerful 
test against  the null  hypothesis  that  money-supply  announcements  have 
no effect. Assessments of such  announcement  effects, often  called  event 
studies in finance, are very popular  because they often produce  signifi- 
cant results. They make sense if one really  believes that the variable  in 
question  is a martingale. 
However, lacking  information  about  when the effect might  be offset, 
it does not make  sense to single  out any short  interval  of time  over which 
subsequent changes in forward rates might be compared with past 
money-stock  innovations.  A reasonable  way of ascertaining  whether  the 
effect of money-stock  movements  is merely  transient  would  be to regress 
the sum of all the changes in forward  rates between t - n and t (that  is, 
R'm)  -  f(n,m)) on the money-stock innovation  made known at t -  n; we 
do this below. The problem is that for all except the smallest n, the 
variance of R(m)  -  ftn,m)  is much higher than the variance of the overnight 
change  in the forward  rate. Thus such a test will have very little power. 
Effects of Changing Duration on the Behavior of Long-Term 
Bond Rates 
Most term-structure  equations  intended  to explain  long-term  interest 
rates build in some way on the idea that the long-term  rate reflects 
expected future  short-term  rates. Table  2 reports  econometric  estimates 
for a standard  equation that assume, in accordance with the linear 
expectations model, that the long-term  bond rate is a weighted sum of 
forward  rates equal to expected future spot rates. The expectations of 
future short-term  rates themselves are taken to depend on a linear 
function of current  and lagged values of inflation  and short-term  rates; 
hence the term-structure  equations  are linear. 
As  noted at the beginning of this paper, the standard equation, 
estimated  from 1955:1  to 1979:3,  has not performed  well in recent  years. 
The equation  underpredicts  the long-term  rate  from 1980:2  to the end of 
1982,  and  the forecast  errors  in most quarters  are  far  outside  a confidence 
interval  of two standard  deviations. 
The predictive  performance  of such an equation  could deteriorate  for 
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linear  expectations model: (1) the forecasting  rule for short-term  rates 
used by the market could change; (2) the weights used to transform 
forward  rates into the long-term  bond rate could change;  or (3) the risk 
or liquidity  premium  separating  forward  rates from  expected spot rates 
could vary. 
Ando and Kennickell  have recently studied  the term-structure  equa- 
tion of the MIT-Pennsylvania-Social  Science Research  Council  (MPS) 
model, which is quite similar  to our standard  model.17 Since 1977  this 
equation  also has displayed  a deterioration  in  fit  and  in the past  two years 
has underpredicted  the long-term  rate in the same way as the equation 
of table 2. Ando and Kennickell  attribute  the decline in fit to the second 
of the three factors mentioned  above. They argue that higher  interest 
rates have reduced the duration  of long-term  bonds, so that a twenty- 
year bond rate today might behave as a ten-year bond rate once did. 
Thus they interpret  the change as a shift in the relation  between long- 
term bond rates and forward  one-period  rates, rather  than as a shift in 
risk  premiums  or in the parameters  of the forecasting  equation  for one- 
period  rates. Indeed, there has been a significant  reduction  in duration. 
From equation 2 we observe that an increase in interest rates from 4 
percent  to 12  percent  decreases the duration  of a twenty-five-year  bond 
from  sixteen years to nine years. 
Ando and Kennickell reestimate the MPS equation for the sample 
period from 1955:3  to 1981:4  and allow for a distributed  lag on short- 
term  interest  rates  whose coefficients  depend  on short-term  rates  in such 
a way that the distributed  lag is shortened  when short-term  rates are 
high. This equation  fits recent observations  with standard  errors  of only 
10  to 20 basis points and has been entered  in the MPS model  in place of 
the old equation  for the long-term  rate. 
Although  the shorter  distributed  lag with more recent observations 
suggests  that the decline in fit is due to the decline  in duration,  there is a 
more  direct test of this effect. We derive a duration-corrected  equation 
for forecasting  the twenty-year  bond rate out of sample  in the following 
way.  Linearized  forward  rates,  fli>->i -i>-  )  (i  =  1,  2,  . .  .,  6),  are 
calculated  from  the observed  term  structure  in the estimation  period  for 
maturities  io, il,  i2,.  .  .,  i6 of 0, 12, 24, 36, 60, 120,  and 240 months. The 
duration-corrected  rate can then be obtained by recombining  these 
forward  rates using  a different  R appropriate  to the forecast  period. 
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Using the table  2 sample  period, 1955:1  to 1979:3,  we linearized  about 
the mean of the twenty-year bond rate, 5.4 percent. Then we recon- 
structed  a duration-corrected  twenty-year  bond  rate,  R,(240),  by using as 
a new point of linearization,  R  =  12.4 percent, the mean twenty-year 
bond rate  from 1979:4  to 1982:4.  Thus 
R,(240) =-  (D  -Dx)ij-  1 ij- ij-  1)  R  I~~  (D'  -D'  )f(ii1  --) 
240 J=1 
where  D' are computed  usingR =  12.4  percent. 
We reestimated  the same term-structure  equation  with  R,(2403  in place 
of Ri240)D240,  making  no other  changes  in the procedure,  and  used this to 
predict  Ri240)  out of sample.18 
The results of our procedure  are reported  in the last two columns  of 
the bottom  part  of table  2. The  duration-corrected  equation  does perform 
better in predicting  Ri240)  out of sample  than the uncorrected  equation; 
its average prediction error in 1981 and 1982 is  120 basis points as 
compared  with 165  basis points for the original  equation. In the worst 
quarter,  1981:4,  the duration  correction  reduces  the underprediction  by 
53 basis points. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the change in duration  is insufficient  to 
explain the recent behavior of long-term interest rates. This is not 
surprising  given the fact that  the term  structure  has not consistently  had 
a steep downward  slope in the past three years. A downward  slope is 
necessary if a reduction in duration, which places greater weight on 
near-term  forward  rates, is to raise the forecast of the long-term  rate. 
Thus the change  in the behavior  of long-term  bond rates must  be due in 
part  to a change  in the relation  of current  and  lagged  short-term  rates  to 
forward  rates. Such a change  could occur either  because of a shift  in the 
market's  forecasting  "rule" for short-term  interest  rates, or because of 
risk  effects on forward  rates given expected future  spot rates. 
Evaluating the Linearized Expectations  Model 
In this section we discuss the performance  of the simple  expectations 
model of the term structure  when allowance  is made  for a risk premium 
18. Note that if we had used the same R to compute  D and  D', then R,240)  would equal 
R,(240),  and  we would  have  obtained  the same  result  as from  the straightforward  estimation 
of the  table  1  equation.  Also note  that  the  above  expression  follows  formally  from  equations 
1, 2, and  6 if one uses R' in place  of R. 188  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
that  is constant  through  time for each maturity.  As we have noted, this 
model is widely used to interpret  the behavior of financial markets. 
Expectations  models have been extensively tested. The tests typically 
ignore the presence of coupons and hence assume a flat weighting 
scheme. For an obligation  issued with a maturity  of no more  than  a year 
there are generally no coupons, so a flat weighting  scheme is entirely 
appropriate.  For a bond with short  maturity,  the decay of the weighting 
scheme in equation 1 is sufficiently  small that the difference  between 
W(k) in that equation and a flat weighting scheme, W(k) =  I/i,  k  = 
0,  1,  ...,  i  -  1,  is  relatively  unimportant.  Empirical  work  on  an 
expectations model regarding  long maturities  (ten, twenty, or thirty 
years), on the other hand,  is relatively  scarce, and  for these maturities  a 
flat  weighting  scheme would  be highly  inappropriate. 
Rather  than survey the extensive literature  on the term  structure,  we 
instead offer some simple tests of the predictive  content of the simple 
expectations model. Does a term structure  that, after correcting  for a 
constant  liquidity  premium,  slopes upward  for a higher  maturity  actually 
portend  higher  interest  rates for the future?  Does the value of the term 
structure  in predicting  future interest rates depend on how far in the 
future  one is looking?  The answer  to these simple  questions  has not been 
emphasized  in the empirical  literature  on the term  structure.  19  We show 
here that changes in interest  rates do not bear a positive relation  to the 
predicted  change  and  that, as Macaulay  first  noted, long-term  rates  tend 
to move in the opposite direction  from  the predicted  change.20 
Our  tests can be expressed in this simple  form because we begin by 
constructing  linearized  forward  rates. According to the theory, these 
embodv  the  market's  exnectntionn  of future  interest  rates:  thuis hv uisinc 
19. Much of this literature  has, in effect, asked whether  a secular  increase  in short- 
term  rates has been matched  by a similar  increase  in long-term  rates. The most common 
test of the model  is to regress  a spot rate  on an appropriately  dated  forward  rate. But this 
test has low power  against  the plausible  alternative  hypothesis  that  both short-  and long- 
term  interest  rates have followed comparable  trends.  The question  noted  in the text was 
studied  by Shiller  ("The  Volatility  of Long-Term  Interest  Rates"),  but  for long-term  rates 
only. We have not been  able  to find  any  careful  evaluation  of this  question  in  the literature, 
except in a few brief  responses  to that  paper. 
20. Macaulay  did  not  document  this  fact  oremphasize  it. He thought  his  more  important 
observation  was the low correlation  between  forward  rates  and  subsequent  spot rates.  He 
did note: "the yields of bonds of the highest  grade  should  fall during  a period  in which 
short-term  rates are higher  than  the yields of the bonds  and  rise during  a period  in which 
short-term  rates are lower. Now experience  is more nearly  the opposite." (Macaulay, 
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them we avoid the need to impose and test complicated  cross-equation 
restrictions on vector autoregressive  systems, including  a short- and 
long-term  interest  rate.21 
Our  tests, which involve three-  and six-month  Treasury  bill  rates and 
the thirty-year  Treasury  bond yield, use all data  available  for the first  of 
the month  in series form  from  Salomon  Brothers  but  do not make  use of 
additional  daily data within the month.22  We checked our data against 
analogous  data available  for a shorter  interval  of time from the Federal 
Reserve Board. Earlier  studies  have not generally  exploited  richer  data 
sources and in many  cases have used inferior  data (for  example, annual 
averages when observations  at points of time are appropriate).  Some 
studies  have  used  dataon  individual  bond  issues, which  therefore  provide 
more  observations,  and  others  have explored  the term  structure  in other 
countries. It should be kept in mind, however, that not all of these 
additional  data are valuable. Markets for most individual  bonds are 
"thin," and  there  are  significant  institutional  and  legal  differences  across 
countries. Our  sample  of U.S. Treasury-issue  yields avoids these diffi- 
culties. We mention  as a final caveat that some studies have identified 
anomalous  features  of the data  that  we ignore.  For example, Roll claims 
that  forward  rate  changes  have  fat-tailed  probability  distributions,  which 
can lead to spuriously  significant  t-statistics  in a regression  analysis.23 
It is important  to distinguish tests of the model based on short 
maturities  from  tests based on longer  maturities.  It is plausible  that the 
expectations theory might work better for the shorter maturities.  We 
look first  at its value in predicting  short-term  rates. Figure 1 presents a 
scatter diagram  with data on quarterly  changes, 1959:1  to 1982:3, in 
three-month  Treasury  bill  rates, R3)  -  R'>3),  on the vertical  axis and  the 
predicted  change, F(3  3) -  R(3), implied  by the three- and six-month  bill 
rates on the horizontal  axis. Measurements  are for the first  trading  day 
of March,  June, September,  and  December. Our  model, which includes 
21. Hansen and Sargent, "Exact Linear Expectations  Models," and Sargent, "A 
Note,"  have used the cross-equation  approach. The former paper imposes all the 
restrictions  implied  by the expectations  theory  and rejects  the model. However, it is not 
clear how to interpret  the rejection  of cross-equation  restrictions;  Hansen and Sargent 
state  that  the expectations  model  may  still  be a good  forecaster  of changes  in  interest  rates. 
(See note 55 below.) 
22.  Salomon Brothers, An Analytical Record of Yields and Yield Spreads (New York, 
1983). 
23.  Roll, The Behavior of Interest Rates. Figure 1. Actual versus Predicted Change in Short-Term  Rate, 1959:1-1982:3a 
Actual change (percentage points) 
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a. Quarterly  data, ninety-five  observations,  from the first  day of March,  June, September,  and December.  The 
short-term  rate  is the three-month  Treasury  bill rate;  the predicted  change  from  the term  structure  is the three-month 
ahead,  three-month  forward  rate  minus  the current  three-month  rate.  The forward  rate  is computed  from  the current 
three-  and six-month  rates.  The predicted  change  is computed  without  allowing  for a constant  risk  premium  and  thus 
is, by our model,  the true  predicted  change  plus a constant.  The estimated  relation  is reported  in table  3, row 1. R. J. Shiller, J.  Y. Campbell,  and K. L. Schoenholtz  191 
the assumption  that  expectations  are  rational,  implies  that  the  error  terms 
are uncorrelated  in a regression of R(323  -  RQ3)  on a constant and on 
13  3,3)  -  R(3), and  that the slope coefficient  is 1.0. The intercept  reflects  a 
constant risk premium.24  The dashed line shown is drawn  through  the 
sample mean with a slope of 1.0. The estimated  regression  line (from 
row 1 of table 3) is the solid line with a negative slope and is almost  five 
standard  deviations  from 1.0. 
We did not attempt to correct for heteroscedasticity  over the full 
sample period because the recent increase in the volatility of interest 
rates is extreme and does not represent  the continuation  of a historical 
trend.25  However, we did adopt a method suggested by Hansen and 
Hodrick, which allows us to use the full sample of monthly data by 
correcting  the error  term  for serial  correlation.26  Our  application  of this 
corrected  ordinary  least squares  estimation  method  for the period  from 
January  1959  to October 1982  is reported  in row 2 of table 3. The use of 
monthly  rather  than  quarterly  data  has little  effect on the point  estimates 
but does increase their precision. All other results in table 3, with the 
exception of row 6, are based on monthly  data. 
To test the conjecture that the expectations model might perform 
better in the period before the introduction  of new Federal Reserve 
24. The intercept is important,  for note that  F(3'3)  -  RQ3)  is,  with one important 
exception, always positive  or near  zero. If we did not take account  of the risk premium, 
the model would  be obviously  wrong,  as the term  structure  would  nearly  always predict 
increases  in  interest  rates.  Before  testing  the  model  we must  therefore  add  the  risk  premium 
term, Vi,  which was mentioned  above in connection  with equation  1, but was omitted  in 
the text only for expositional  simplicity. 
25. Glejser  suggests  a simple  method  for correcting  for  error  variance  which  follows a 
steady  time trend.  See H. Glejser,  "A New Test for Heteroskedasticity,"  Journal  of the 
American  Statistical  Association, vol. 64 (March  1969),  pp. 316-23. The absolute  values 
of the residuals  from  a preliminary  regression  are regressed  on both a constant  and  time; 
the reciprocals  of the fitted  values  are  used  as weights  in a second  regression.  Mishkin  has 
applied this method to an earlier  sample period. See Frederic  S. Mishkin, "Efficient- 
Markets  Theory:  Implications  for Monetary  Policy," BPEA, 3:1978, pp. 707-52, and  A 
Rational Expectations  Approach to Macroeconomics:  Testing Policy Ineffectiveness  and 
Efficient-Markets  Models  (University  of Chicago,  1983).  For  the full sample,  1959-82,  we 
found  that this method  gave almost  all the weight  to two or three  early  observations  and 
therefore  produced  highly  erratic  results. 
26. See Lars Peter Hansen and Robert  J. Hodrick, "Forward  Exchange Rates as 
Optimal  Predictors  of Future  Spot  Rates:  An Econometric  Analysis,"  Journal  of Political 
Economy,  vol. 88 (October  1980),  pp. 829-53. Quarterly  changes  in interest  rates  overlap 
when sampled  monthly.  Therefore  the error  term  follows a third-order  moving  average 
process, and  the estimated  coefficient  standard  errors  must  take  this into  account. S  >  b  O  o  < 
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operating  procedures in October 1979, we shortened our sample and 
repeated our regression tests with and without a heteroscedasticity 
correction  (rows 3 and 4 of table 3). The negative slope for the entire 
sample period is due primarily  to recent observations. When we drop 
these observations, the slope coefficient becomes positive; but it is 
insignificantly  different  from zero and significantly  different  from 1.0.27 
This result is not altered  by further  shortening  of the sample period  to 
exclude  the unusual  period  of volatile  interest  rates  in 1974-75  (row  5).28 
The situation  is, if anything,  worse for long-term  bond  rates. Figure  2 
shows a scatter  diagram  with  changes  over a six-month  interval  in thirty- 
year, or 360-month,  bond yields, RQ60)  -  R(360),  on the vertical  axis and 
on the horizontal  axis the predicted  change,  f(6,354)  -  Ri360)),  implied  by 
the 360-month  yield and the six-month  yield at the beginning  of the six- 
month  period. The R used to compute  the linearized  forward  rates was 
6.65 percent a year. Once again, the model implies  that the error  terms 
are serially  uncorrelated  in a regression  of R(160) -  Ri360)  on a constant 
and  f6,154)  -  M160),  and the theoretical  slope coefficient  is 1.0.29 Thus a 
simple  regression  test is an appropriate  way to test for market  efficiency 
with long-term bonds. Such a test may be regarded  as a "forward- 
filtered" test, as defined by Hayashi and Sims, of the model of equa- 
27. The estimated coefficient resembles the coefficient in a similar  regression  by 
Hamburger  and  Platt  (their  equation  5). However,  these authors  inexplicably  conclude  in 
favor of the expectations  model. See Michael  J. Hamburger  and Elliott N. Platt, "The 
Expectations  Hypothesis and the Efficiency of the Treasury  Bill Market,"  Review of 
Economics  and Statistics,  vol. 57 (May 1975), pp. 190-99. 
28. More favorable  results for the simple  expectations  model were found  in Shiller, 
using  data  on six- and  twelve-month  1.5  percent  Treasury  notes (Series  EA and  EO)  and  a 
slightly  earlier  sample. (Shiller, "Alternative  Tests of Rational  Expectations  Models.") 
The more  favorable  results  were not due to the slightly  different  sample  or to the slightly 
different  maturities.  Using regression  diagnostic  procedures  described  by Belsley, Kuh, 
and  Welsch,  it was found  that  the results  in that  paper  were  heavily  influenced  by the 1970- 
I and 1970-11  observations. See David A. Belsley, Edwin Kuh, and Roy E. Welsch, 
Regression  Diagnostics:  Identifying Influential Data  and Sources of Collinearity (Wiley, 
1980).  As confirmed  by the Commercial  and  Financial  Chronicle  for  those  dates,  the yields 
on these Treasury  notes were behaving  erratically  at that time. As noted in Shiller, 
quantities  of the Treasury  notes outstanding  fell below $100  million  after 1969,  and the 
"thin" markets  made price data less reliable. (Shiller, "Alternative  Tests of Rational 
Expectations  Models.")  When  the same  regressions  in that  paper  were run  truncating  the 
sample  at 1969-II,  they  confirmed  the negative  results  for  the expectations  theory  reported 
here. 
29. We approximated  here  by ignoring  the difference  between  R'354'  and  R'360'. Figure 2.  Actual versus Predicted Change in Long-Term  Rate, 1959-82a 
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Source:  Same  as figure  1. 
a. Semiannual  data, 1959-82,  forty-eight  observations  from  the first  day of January  and July.  The long-term  rate 
is the thirty-year  Treasury  bond  rate;  the predicted  change  from  the term structure  is the six-month  ahead,  thirty- 
year  linearized  forward  rate minus  the current  thirty-year  rate. The forward  rate is computed  from  the current  six- 
month  and thirty-year  rates. Predicted  change  is computed  without  allowing  for a constant  risk premium  and thus 
is, by our model,  the true  predicted  change  plus a constant.  The estimated  relation  is reported  in table  3, row 6. R. J. Shiller,  J.  Y. Campbell,  and K. L. Schoenholtz  195 
tion 1.30 However, it is possible that other tests, such as the "volatility 
tests" developed by Shiller in his 1979  paper, may have more power. 
Shown  are a dashed  line drawn  through  the sample  mean  with a slope of 
1.0 and a solid line for the regression. As in the case of the short-term 
rates, the results of the test do not support  the theory:  when long-term 
rates are  predicted  to rise, they in fact tend to go down. 
The predicted six-month change in the thirty-year bond rate is 
approximately  the spread between the thirty-year  bond yield and the 
six-month  rate,  divided  by the  duration  (measured  in  six-month  intervals) 
of a thirty-year  bond minus 1.0. The magnitude  of the estimated  coeffi- 
cient thus depends on the R used to compute  duration.  If, for example, 
we had chosen R  =  3 percent rather  than 6.65 percent, the duration 
given by equation  2 would rise from fourteen  to twenty years, and the 
estimated  coefficient  would  be multiplied  by 20/14 = 1.43. But changing 
the duration  used could never change  the sign  of the coefficient. 
The variance  of the predicted  change  in long-term  rates in figure  2 is 
much smaller  than the variance  of the actual  change, so the probability 
of rejecting  the hypothesis  that  the slope is 1.0  if the slope  term  is actually 
zero (in statistical  terms, the power) is low. The horizontal  axis in the 
figure  had  to be drawn  on a different  scale than  the vertical  (as shown  by 
the flatter  appearance  of the dashed line). Had they been on the same 
scale, the scatter  of points would be so close together  horizontally  that 
they would be indistinguishable. 
The estimated coefficients for thirty-year  bond rates in table 3 are 
always negative; but reflecting  the low power of the tests, they have 
extremely  large  standard  errors.  Nevertheless, our  use of monthly  data 
gives the estimates some additional  precision, and  we are able to reject 
at the 4.5 percent confidence  level the hypothesis  that the coefficient  is 
1.0  in row 8. This  regression  corrects  for moving-average  errors  but  does 
not correct for heteroscedasticity; when we perform weighted least 
squares  we still reject at the 5.5 percent level in row 9. These results 
confirm  for a shorter  but more  frequently  sampled  period  the regression 
tests reported  in Shiller.3" 
The standard  deviation  of the actual  change  in interest  rates is about 
30. Fumio  Hayashi  and  Christopher  Sims, "Nearly  Efficient  Estimation  of Time  Series 
Models  with  Predetermined,  but  not Exogenous,  Instruments,"  Econometrica,  vol. 51 
(May 1983),  pp. 783-98. 
31. Shiller,  "Volatility  of Long-Term  Interest  Rates." 196  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1983 
two and a half times the standard  deviation  of the predicted  change  for 
the short-term  interest rates in figure 1 and about fourteen times the 
standard  deviation of the predicted change for the long-term  interest 
rates in figure 2. Thus under the null hypothesis that the true slope 
coefficient is 1.0, the R2 of the regressions ought to be small: about 
1/[(2.5)2] =  0.16 for the  short-term rate regression,  about  1/[(14)2] = 
0.005  for the long-term.  At least for the short-term  rate  regression  the  R2 
value is large enough that a test of the null hypothesis against an 
alternative  that  R2 equals zero should  have some power. 
Under the null hypothesis, the standard  deviation of the estimated 
coefficients in an ordinary least squares regression should be about 
2.5/[N(0 5)]  for the short-term  rate  regressions  and 14/[N(0  5)]  for the long- 
term  rate  regressions,  where  N is the number  of observations.  There  are 
ninety-five  observations  in figure  1 and  forty-eight  observations  in figure 
2, implying  standard  errors  of roughly  0.25 and 2.0, respectively. Thus 
we easily reject  the short  rate  regression  at conventional  levels because 
there is no apparent  relation  between actual  and  predicted  changes. We 
also reject at this level for the long-term  rate regressions that use the 
more numerous monthly observations;  for these regressions the esti- 
mated  coefficients  are decidedly  negative. 
To summarize these results, the sample evidence is not for the 
hypothesis  that  the slope of the term  structure  correctly  forecasts  future 
changes in interest rates. This behavior of long-term  bond rates has 
straightforward  implications  for optimal  financing  decisions of corpora- 
tions and individuals  who are concerned  purely  with expected returns. 
According  to the expectations  theory, such investors  should  be indiffer- 
ent about  investing "long" or "short." The results suggest, contrary  to 
the theory, that the six-month  returns  to holding  bonds are higher  than 
on bills  when the bond  rate  is relatively  high.  For example,  row 8 of table 
3 implies  that such an investor  would  prefer  to buy thirty-year  Treasury 
bonds rather than six-month Treasury  bills whenever the thirty-year 
yield exceeds the six-month  yield by 75 basis points  or more. 
From 1959  to 1982,  such a risk-neutral  investor  would  have been long 
approximately  45 percent  of the time. The slope of the term structure  is 
a sufficiently  good predictor  of excess returns  to overcome the fact that 
average  returns  on long-term  bonds have been lower than  on short-term 
bonds. The current  spread  of over 200 basis points makes long invest- 
ments  preferable  by a considerable  margin.  By this  reasoning,  companies R. J. Shiller, J.  Y. Campbell,  and K. L. Schoenholtz  197 
should delay long financing  until long-term  rates fall relative to short- 
term rates, and householders  should not switch from floating  to fixed 
rate  mortgages  until  this  occurs.32  It is perhaps  surprising  only  to students 
of the expectations theory that this is what a naive person might  have 
done without  the guidance  of a sophisticated  model.33 
Of course, the participants  in the bond  market  may  well be concerned 
with  risk  as well as with  expected  returns,  and  our  rejection  of the simple 
expectations  theory could be attributed  to variations  in risk premiums 
that  are so large  as to destroy  any information  in the term  structure  about 
future  interest rates. Such an explanation  is in closer accordance  with 
current  theoretical  predispositions  than one that points to "irrational" 
markets.  However, lacking  any theoretical  restrictions  on the variation 
in risk  premiums,  these hypotheses cannot  be distinguished. 
Two approaches might preserve the relevance of the expectations 
model by embedding  it in a more general  theory. One possibility is to 
specify a time-varying  risk  premium  in terms  of observed  data,  a method 
we employ below. Another  is to suppose that the risk premium  moves 
slowly enough that extremely short-term movements in yields (as 
between trading  days before and after  a money announcement)  can still 
be understood in terms of a simple expectations model. We have no 
tangible  evidence, of course, that the risk premiums  do not move from 
one day to the next. 
Time-Varying  Risk, Variability of Interest Rates, 
and Credit Volume 
Systematic differences  between the long-term  rate and the expected 
value of future short-term  rates have been given many names: risk 
premium,  liquidity  premium,  habitat  effect, market  segmentation  effect, 
32. This prescription  is valid only if our results  for government  securities  carry  over 
to private  debt. 
33. Some  economists  have  offered  suggestions  for  corporate  financing  that  are  designed 
to achieve tax savings,  but these depend  crucially  on the expectations  theory  of the term 
structure.  For example,  Roger  Gordon  argues  that corporations  should  issue short-term 
debt when short-term  rates are high to accelerate  tax deductible  interest  payments.  See 
Roger  H. Gordon, "Interest  Rates, Inflation,  and Corporate  Financial  Policy," BPEA, 
2:1982,  pp. 461-88. Our  results suggest  it is not surprising  that  few corporate  treasurers 
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and so on. Here we model changes in this discrepancy as reflecting 
changing  levels of uncertainty.  Suppose we add a risk premium  term, 
Vit,  to the model in equation  1. The one-period  excess holding  return  on 
an i-period bond, hfi I) -  RM, then equals DiVi, -  (Di -  1) E,Vi  ,+I plus 
noise unforecastable  at time t. By regressing  the difference between 
h(i,  l and  RM')  on observable  and  relevant  variables,  we can then estimate 
the risk premium.  If i =  2, then Vi1,t+1  is zero by definition  and the 
value of the excess holding  return  predicted  by the regression  divided 
by D2 (or roughly  2) may be regarded  as an estimated V2,.  This method 
of estimating  the risk premium  was proposed by Kessel.34  If i is very 
large and if  Vit =  EtVi  1,t+ I is  assumed,  the  value  predicted  by  the 
regression  is itself an estimate  of Vit. 
A number  of earlier  studies of the term structure  have used an eight- 
quarter  moving  standard  deviation  of the three-month  Treasury  bill  yield 
as an ad hoc measure  of time-varying  risk.35  Row 1  of table  4 shows that 
this  variable  is indeed  significant  in  predicting  excess three-month  returns 
on six-month  Treasury  bills for the sample  period, 1959-79. We found 
that  the moving  standard  deviation  was much  less successful  in  predicting 
excess returns  on long-term  bonds (perhaps  because of the much  higher 
variance  of these returns  and their persistent tendency to be negative 
during  1959-79).  Therefore  we do not  report  regressions  with  this  variable 
for long-term  bond  returns. 
The moving  standard  deviation  proxy for risk  is not derived  from  any 
well-articulated  economic theory. In fact, the basic message  of standard 
finance models is that it is not the volatility of asset returns  but their 
covariance  with  other  asset returns  or  underlying  factors  that  determines 
their  "riskiness." Further,  the empirical  results  are  not robust.  The risk 
variable  becomes much  less significant  if the sample  period  is extended 
to include  the last three years or if a simple moving standard  deviation 
34.  Reuben A. Kessel,  The Cyclical Behavior of the Term Structure of Interest Rates 
(National  Bureau  of Economic  Research  and  Columbia  University  Press, 1965).  Kessel in 
fact used the difference  between the forward  rate and the subsequent  spot rate as the 
dependent  variable  in his regression,  but inspection  of equations  3 and  4 shows that  this 
difference  is a constant  multiple  of the excess holding  return. 
35. This  tradition  seems to have started  with  Modigliani  and  Shiller,  "Inflation."  The 
variable  has  also been  used  by, among  others,  Ando  and  Kennickell,  "A Reappraisal";  by 
Jones and Roley in David S. Jones and V. Vance Roley, "Rational  Expectations,  the 
Expectations  Hypothesis  and  Treasury  Bill Yields:  An Econometric  Analysis,"  Working 
Paper  869  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  June  1982);  and  by  Mishkin,  A Rational 
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is replaced  by a predictor  of the variance  of the innovation  in the three- 
month  bill rate. 
The conceptual  inadequacy  of the standard  variable  that  is thought  to 
measure  time variations  in risk suggests that it may be worth seeking 
alternatives.  It is widely believed that the volume of short- and long- 
term debt issue, the level of rates, and the shape of the yield curve are 
all  jointly determined.  Economists  have long argued  about  the merits  of 
"preferred  habitat"  theories in which borrowers  and lenders, because 
of their  particular  needs, prefer  to enter the market  at different  maturi- 
ties. The belief that excess return  may be required  to induce investors 
to move from  their  preferred  habitat  is itself a basis for policymakers  to 
believe that they may be able to twist the yield curve by government 
debt  management.  Recently  Friedman  and  Roley have pursued  research 
programs  based on the premise  that supply  and  demand  curves for debt 
are econometrically  identifiable.36  They have sought to isolate factors 
that shift one curve without  affecting  the other. 
Our  more  modest  goal here  is to see if a volume  variable  that  measures 
the relative amount  of activity in the short  end of the market  compared 
to the long end helps to predict  risk  premiums  as we have defined  them. 
In row 2 of table 4 we regress excess returns  on six-month  bills on the 
previous quarter's  ratio of short borrowing  to long financing  by U.S. 
corporations.37  This volume ratio  may be related  to market  perceptions 
of the risk in longer-term  bonds but can show either a positive or a 
negative  relation  to the risk premium,  depending  on whether  borrowers 
or lenders are more adversely affected. The volume ratio is indeed a 
significant  predictor  of excess returns  for 1959-82, and if it is included 
in a regression  along  with  the moving  standard  deviation  (row  3), we find 
that the volume ratio dominates the conventional measure of risk. 
36. See especially  Benjamin  M. Friedman,  "Financial  Flow Variables  and  the Short- 
Run  Determination  of Long-Term  Interest  Rates," Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol. 85 
(August 1977), pp. 661-89, and "Substitution  and Expectation  Effects on Long-Term 
Borrowing  Behavior and Long-Term  Interest Rates," Journal of Money, Credit  and 
Banking,  vol. 11  (May 1979),  pp. 131-50;  and  V. Vance  Roley, "The  Determinants  of the 
Treasury  Security  Yield Curve,"  Journal  of Finance, vol. 36 (December  1981),  pp. 1103- 
26, and "Asset Substitutability  and  the Impact  of Federal  Deficits,"  Working  Paper  1082 
(National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  February  1983). 
37. These data  are ultimately  derived  from  the U.S. flow-of-funds  accounts,  but  were 
aggregated  for us by Salomon  Brothers.  Following  the flow-of-funds  convention, short 
borrowing  is of maturity  less than  one year, and  long  financing  is all other  borrowing. R. J.  Shiller, J.  Y. Campbell,  and K. L. Schoenholtz  201 
However, it is not significant  over the shorter  and  earlier  sample  period, 
1959-79. The volume ratio is significant  only at the 10 percent level in 
predicting  excess returns  on long-term  bonds (row  4).38 
The fitted values from these regressions give our best estimates of 
risk  premiums.  How do these estimates  change  over time?  Consider  row 
1 of table 4. The moving standard  deviation  of annualized  three-month 
bill  rates  averaged  70 basis points  over the twenty-year  period  from 1959 
to 1979.  In 1979-82  it increased  from  about 140  basis points  in early 1979 
to a high of over 250 basis points in late 1981  and in 1982.  According  to 
the regression of table 4, row 1, this implies that the expected excess 
holding  return  on six-month  bills was 55 basis points higher than the 
previous  average  in 1979,  and 140  basis points  higher  in 1982.  Adjusting 
for duration,  this means that the risk premium  in the six-month  bill rate 
was about 27.5 basis points higher  in 1979  and 70 basis points higher  in 
1982  than  in the previous  twenty years. 
For long-term  bond rates the moving standard  deviation proxy for 
risk is less successful. An alternative  is to treat  the spread  between the 
six-month  and  thirty-year  rates  as a risk  proxy  and  ask  what  risk  premium 
was implied  by the maximum  1982  spread  of 2.5 percent.  The answer  to 
this question is contained in the regression of table 4, row 5. There 
excess holding returns  on thirty-year  bonds are regressed on the pre- 
dicted change  in thirty-year  rates. This predicted  change  variable  is just 
the spread  divided by the duration  of a thirty-year  bond (which in the 
1959-79  sample period averaged 13.5 years or 27 six-month  time units) 
minus  one. The coefficient  of 71, divided  by 26, implies  that on average 
when the spread  is 1 percent, the risk premium  in the long-term  rate is 
2.7 percent. Given the  1982 maximum spread of  2.5 percent, our 
regression suggests that the risk premium  peaked at 6.8 percent. The 
very large  values of the estimated  risk  premiums  seem implausible,  but 
of course they are necessary if we are to interpret  the term structure  in 
these terms.  The  risk  premium  must  move  enough  to explain  the  perverse 
behavior of the term structure  in predicting  future long-term  interest 
rates. 
Finally,  we can ask whether  the risk  variables  of this section improve 
the expectations model as might  be hoped. Rows 6, 7, and 8 of table 4 
38. Our  success with this crude  measure  of relative  volume  by maturity  suggests  that 
policymakers  would  benefit  from  more  frequent  and  accurate  collection  of data  summariz- 
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represent  rows 3, 1, and  6, respectively,  from  table 3 with risk  variables 
added.39  We hoped that the addition  of these variables  would bring  the 
coefficient  of the predicted  change closer to 1.0. In fact, the coefficient 
is only slightly  closer to 1.0 for the short-term  rate and  farther  from 1.0 
for the long-term  rate. 
Money Announcements  and the Term Structure of Interest Rates 
The  tendency  for  interest  rates  to rise  suddenly  after  an  announcement 
of an unexpectedly large money stock has been widely noted. Some 
have interpreted this effect of a surprise money announcement as 
implying  that  expansionary  monetary  policy actually  raises  interest  rates 
through its anticipated effect on inflation  rather than lowering them 
through  a liquidity  effect as traditional  Keynesian  theory  would  predict. 
In this section we describe  the money-surprise  effect and  also refine  the 
interpretation  of it. We argue, for example, that it is quite wrong to 
interpret  the response to money surprises  as disproving  the Keynesian 
liquidity  effect on interest  rates. 
Figure 3 displays on the vertical axis the change in a short-term 
interest rate plotted against, on the horizontal  axis, the surprise  in the 
money stock for each week between February  1980  and February  1983. 
To calculate the money-surprise  variable  one needs a measure of the 
actual  and the expected money stock. The money stock selected corre- 
sponds to the unrevised  narrow  measure  of money emphasized  by the 
Federal  Reserve (MIB, renamed  MI in January  1982).  The money-stock 
announcement  occurred in our sample on Fridays at 4:10 p.m. The 
expected money measure  employed is the Tuesday median  forecast of 
the money stock from the weekly market survey of Money Market 
Services, Inc. In the figure  the money surprise  is the difference  between 
the actual  and expected money stocks. 
Several  authors,  including  Cornell  and  Roley, have sought  to evaluate 
the efficiency of the Money Market Services forecast.40  They have 
shown that the forecast is efficient with respect to information  sets 
39. Slight sample changes were necessitated by the quarterly  measurement  of the 
volume  ratio. 
40. Cornell,  "Money  Supply  Announcements,"  and  Roley, "The  Response  of Short- 
Term  Interest  Rates." Figure 3.  The Money-Announcement  Effect, February 1980 to February 1983 
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Reserve  System  and Money  Market Services,  Inc. 
a.  Weekly  data, with some  weeks  omitted  because  of holidays;  132 observations  from  1980 (eighth week)  to  1983 
(fourth week).  The  interest  rate is  the  three-month  Treasury  bill rate.  Its  change  is  measured  from 3:30 p.m.  on 
Friday to 3:30 p.m.  on Monday.  The money-surprise  variable is the difference  between  the money  stock announced 
on  Friday,  in $ billions,  and the previous  Tuesday's  median forecast  of  the money  stock  from the weekly  survey 
conducted  by Money  Market Services,  Inc. Also  shown  is the regression line reported in table 5, row 3. 204  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
containing  the lagged  forecasts and current  and  lagged  interest  rates. In 
addition,  it generates  a lower root mean  squared  error  in prediction  than 
an (ARIMA) model based on observed money stocks. We do not 
reproduce  these tests but  we can confirm  that  there  is no significant  serial 
correlation  in the forecast errors. 
The vertical  axis displays  the change  in the three-month  Treasury  bill 
interest rate in basis points from Friday at 3:30 p.m. until Monday at 
3:30  p.m. The diagonal  line is a simple  regression  through  the observa- 
tions. The regression  portrayed  in this figure  is found  in row 3 of table  5, 
which also shows the results for yields ranging  from the federal  funds 
rate  (denoted  FF) to the thirty-year  Treasury  bond  yield. The  coefficient 
of the money surprise  is measured  in basis points per $ billion  surprise, 
with  the standard  deviations  in parentheses.  It is apparent  from  the table 
that the money announcement  has a significant,  albeit declining,  effect 
throughout  the entire  term  structure.41  This  reconfirms  the work  of other 
authors  for our more  recent data  sample. 
Previous authors have stressed the statistical significance  of these 
results. However, the R2  values in the table 5 regressions  do not exceed 
0.286; money surprises  explain only a small fraction  of the changes in 
interest  rates  from  Friday  to Monday.  Furthermore,  the sample  variance 
of interest rates from Friday to Monday for our sample from August 
1980 to July 1983 is only one-third  of the weekly variance in interest 
rates (measured  from either Friday  to Friday  or Monday  to Monday). 
Hence if the yields approximate  a random  walk over the week, the 
regressions  explain only 3 to 10  percent  of the weekly movement  in the 
rates.  It is only by concentrating  the  period  of observation  closely around 
the announcement  that results of this magnitude  can be obtained.  This 
is an  example  of the general  problem  with  event studies  discussed  above. 
Because R2 is so low, the theory does not explain much of what is 
happening;  moreover, there is room for a wide variety of explanations 
involving unobserved variables, which might significantly  alter the 
41. An alternative  measure  of the money-stock  forecast  error  suggested  by Roley  was 
also employed.  This involves regressing  the Money  Market  Services, Inc., forecast  error 
on the change  in the three-month  interest  rate  from  Tuesday  to Friday  (to account  for  new 
information  available  between the forecast and the money-stock  announcement)  and to 
use the residuals  from  this regression  as the exogenous  variable  in the table  5 regression. 
Because the results closely approximate  the regressions  displayed  in table 5, we do not 
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Table 5.  Regressions  of One-Day Change in Interest Rates on Money-Stock 
Surprises 
Weekly  data, February  1980  to February  1983a 
Coefficient 
of 
Dependent  money-stock 
variable  Constant  surprise  R2 
AFF  -  1.12  7.86  0.086 
(5.21)  (2.25) 
AR"M  7.01  7.13  0.128 
(3.80)  (1.63) 
AR(3)  4.25  9.88  0.222 
(3.76)  (1.62) 
AR(6)  6.11  9.32  0.228 
(3.49)  (1.50) 
AR(12)  1.96  8.16  0.245 
(2.91)  (1.26) 
,5,R(24)  0.31  6.86  0.286 
(2.20)  (0.95) 
A_R(36)  1.08  6.13  0.275 
(2.03)  (0.87) 
A-R(60)  2.68  4.83  0.227 
(1.82)  (0.78) 
AR(84)  2.80  4.22  0.209 
(1.67)  (0.72) 
AR(120)  2.96  3.36  0.161 
(1.56)  (0.67) 
AR(240)  3.12  2.79  0.114 
(1.58)  (0.68) 
AR(360)  2.94  2.75  0.119 
(1.53)  (0.66) 
Source:  Authors'  calculations. 
a.  Data based on  132 observations  from 1980 (eighth week)  to 1983 (fourth week).  The A symbol denotes  a change 
between  3:30 p.m.  on the day of the weekly  money-stock  announcement  and 3:30 p.m.  on the first trading day after 
the announcement; FF denotes  the federal funds rate at the end of the day; RQJ)  denotes  annualized yield to maturity 
in basis points on bond or bill with j  months  to maturity.  For maturities of less  than twelve  months,  the yields  are 
for U.S.  Treasury bills.  For maturities longer than twelve  months,  the yields are for U.S.  Treasury notes and bonds. 
The money  surprise variable is  the difference  between  the money  stock  announced  on  Friday in billions of dollars 
and the Tuesday  median forecast  of  the money  stock  from the weekly  market survey  of Money  Market Services, 
Inc.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
interpretation  of the observed simple  correlation.  For example, it could 
be conjectured  that  money surprises  are sometimes  taken  by the market 
as a reason to expect higher interest rates, and at other times lower 
interest  rates, depending  on the stage of the business  cycle, the position 
of  the money stock within the target range, or speculation about 
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former  circumstance  might  simply  have occurred  more  frequently  than 
the latter.42 
Other research on the money-announcement  phenomenon  has ex- 
amined a number  of questions that we have left aside. For example, 
Roley has examined  the change in Federal Reserve policy in October 
1979, and has found that the money-announcement  effect was much 
weaker  and  less significant  before that  date. We would  like to be able to 
determine  whether  the effect weakened  in late 1982  due to a policy shift 
toward  stabilizing  the federal  funds  rate,  but  we do not  yet have sufficient 
data.  Roley has also examined  potential  nonlinearities  such as the effect 
of money-stock  innovations  that  lie outside the identified  target  bounds 
of the Federal Reserve for monetary  growth. Urich and Wachtel also 
examined  the effect of price-index  announcements  on interest  rates  but 
found  relatively  weak effects.43 
The results above showing that money surprises  have a significant 
impact on long-term bond rates do not indicate whether this simply 
reflects  the effect on the current  short-term  rate  in equation  1  or whether 
forward  rates  further  in the  future  are  also affected.  In  table  6 we estimate 
the effect of money surprises  on forward  rates (calculated  according  to 
equation  4). Hardouvelis  examined  the same effect in a recent unpub- 
lished  paper  but, in the absence of a formula  for calculating  the forward 
rate  on coupon-carrying  bonds, treated  the yields on Treasury  issues as 
pure discount bonds."4  As can be seen from equation 4, this places 
42. The effect of the money-stock  innovation  might  seem even less impressive  when 
one considers Grossman's  observation  that there has been virtually  zero correlation 
between  initially  announced  weekly money-stock  changes  and the final,  revised  data  on 
changes  in the money stock. See Jacob  Grossman,  "The 'Rationality'  of Money Supply 
Expectations  and the Short-Run  Response of Interest Rates to Monetary  Surprises," 
Journal of Money,  Credit and Banking,  vol.  13 (November  1981), pp. 409-24.  Maravall 
and Pearce found that preliminary  data on two-month  growth  rates of MI gave wrong 
signals  as to whether  MI growth  rates were in the tolerance  range  of the Federal  Open 
Market  Committee  40 percent  of the time. See Agustin  Maravall  and David A. Pearce, 
"Errors  in Preliminary  Money Stock Data and Monetary  Aggregate  Targeting,"  Special 
Studies  Paper  152  (Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System, 1980).  However, 
they attributed  the versions primarily  to changing  seasonal factors. Since the Census 
X-1  1 program  used to deseasonalize  data  is publicly  known,  there  is still good reason  to 
believe that the forecast errors  represent  genuine  errors  in predicting  the money supply 
before  deseasonalization. 
43. Urich  and  Wachtel,  "Effects  of Inflation  and  Money  Supply  Announcements." 
44. Gikas  Hardouvelis,  "Market  Perceptions  of Federal  Reserve  Policy  and  the  Weekly 
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Table 6.  Regressions  of One-Day Change in Linearized  Forward Rates 
on Money-Stock  Surprises 
Weekly data, February  1980  to February  1983a 
Coefficient 
of 
Dependent  money-stock 
variable  Constant  surprise  R2 
AF(1,2)  2.86  11.26  0.203 
(4.54)  (1.96) 
A&F(3,3)  7.98  8.76  0.199 
(3.57)  (1.54) 
AF(6,6)  --2.16  7.01  0.216 
(2.72)  (1.17) 
Af (12,12)  -  1.29  5.72  0.250 
(2.01)  (0.87) 
Af  (24,12)  2.94  4.40  0.138 
(2.24)  (0.96) 
Af(36,24)  5.91  2.19  0.053 
(1.89)  (0.81) 
Af(60,24)  3.27  1.90  0.033 
(2.10)  (0.91) 
Af(84,36)  3.69  -0.41  0.002 
(2.09)  (0.90) 
Af  (120,  120)  3.67  0.90  0.006 
(2.43)  (1.05) 
Af(240,120)  0.59  2.19  0.007 
(5.25)  (2.26) 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
a.  Data based on  132 observations  from 1980 (eighth week) to 1983 (fourth week).  The A symbol denotes  a change 
between  3:30 p.m.  on the day of the weekly  money-stock  announcement  and 3:30 p.m.  on the first trading day after 
the announcement; f  (n,m)  denotes  the annualized m-month linearized forward rate in basis points applying to a time 
n  months  in the  future,  which  by  the  expectations  theory  equals  the  expected  value  of  R-  after n periods.  The 
linearization  was  carried out  around an annualized  interest  rate of  12.8 percent.  For  maturities  less  than twelve 
months,  the forward rates are computed  without linearization  from U.S.  Treasury bill yields.  For maturities longer 
than twelve  months,  the forward rates are computed  from U.S.  Treasury note and bond yields.  The money  surprise 
variable  is  the  difference  between  the  money  stock  announced  on  Friday  in  billions  of  dollars  and the  Tuesday 
median  forecast  of  the  money  stock  from  the  weekly  market  survey  of  Money  Market Services,  Inc.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
excessive  weight on the long-term interest rate, and the equation 
becomes approximately  like the regressions  in which the change in the 
interest rates themselves is the dependent variable. It should not be 
surprising,  then, that Hardouvelis  reobtained  the previous result that 
the money-announcement  effect extends throughout  the entire term 
structure  for thirty  years. 
By contrast, table 6 shows that the money announcement  has a 
significant  effect on the properly  calculated  linearized  forward  rates  only ;:: 
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as far as the five-year  ahead, two-year rate.45  Indeed, the explanatory 
power  of the regression,  as measured  by R2, tapers  off significantly  after 
the two-year  ahead, one-year  rate. These results  are displayed  in figure 
4, in which the horizontal  axis measures  years from  the present  and the 
vertical axis represents  the forward  rate changes in basis points per $ 
billion surprise.  The horizontal  segments in the heavy line correspond 
to the  forward  rates  beginning  at the  left end  of the segment  and  extending 
to the right end. The shaded area identifies  a two-standard-deviation 
bandwidth  on either side of the point estimate  of the effect. The display 
begins with the one-month  Treasury  bill rate and shows all subsequent 
forward  rates  for the twenty-year  ahead, ten-year  rate. 
How is one to interpret  this money-surprise  effect? It is instructive 
first to consider the effect of money surprises  on the shortest interest 
rate, the federal funds rate. This requires  an awareness of some basic 
institutional  facts about the current  regime  of monetary  control. Under 
the system of lagged  reserve accounting,  banks  must hold reserves in a 
given  statement  week (Wednesday  to Wednesday)  to cover  their  deposits 
of two weeks earlier.46  This lag is the same as the delay in reporting  the 
level of Ml. Furthermore,  banks can hold their reserves on any day of 
the statement  week so long as the average  over the week is at least at the 
required  level (and subject  to the constraint  that random  shocks should 
not exhaust  their  reserve account  at the Federal  Reserve). 
On any day the federal funds rate may be thought  of as the price of 
bank reserves on that day. If we disregard  excess reserves (which are 
generally  small),  the aggregate  demand  schedule  for  reserves  on Wednes- 
day, the last  day  of the statement  week, is vertical.47  Demand  for  reserves 
45. Once again, the standard  errors  appear  in parentheses.  The notation  DF (60,24) 
refers  to the change  in the sixty-month  ahead,  twenty-four  month  rate  from  Friday  at 3:30 
p.m. to the  following  Monday  at 3:30  p.m. For  maturities  up to twelve months  the forward 
rates  are computed  without  the linearization  from  Treasury-bill  yields. For maturities  of 
twelve months or more the forward  rates are computed  from Treasury  note and bond 
yields, using  a point  of linearization  of 12.8  percent.  The results  of table  6 are not greatly 
affected  if the forward  rates are computed  with the current  thirty-year  bond  rate  at each 
point  in time  as the point  of linearization. 
46. This system is scheduled  to be replaced  by contemporaneous  reserve  accounting 
in 1984.  As shown below, this change  will alter  the response  of the federal  funds rate to 
money-stock  announcements. 
47. This  also ignores  the possible  effects of a provision  allowing  banks  to carry  excess 
reserves  forward  or to make  up a reserve  deficiency  the following  week. Such  carry-over 
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is completely  inelastic  because it is determined  by reserve  requirements 
arising  from  deposits of two weeks earlier  and  by the fraction  of reserve 
requirements  already fulfilled on earlier days of the statement week. 
Demand  for reserves over any portion  of the statement  week ending  on 
Wednesday  is completely  inelastic  for the same reason. 
The supply schedule for aggregate reserves is determined  by the 
Federal  Reserve because it is the only source  of aggregate  reserves. The 
federal funds rate may be regarded  as a proxy for the total cost of 
borrowing  from  the Federal  Reserve. The funds  rate  is then  the discount 
rate plus the nonpecuniary  costs ("frowns") that are imposed by the 
monetary  authority  on borrowers  at the discount window. The supply 
schedule is upward  sloping since the frowns increase with the amount 
borrowed. 
The intersection of the vertical demand schedule and the upward 
sloping supply schedule for reserves determines  the federal  funds rate 
independently  of the current demand for money. Indeed some have 
argued  that, under  lagged reserve accounting,  the stock of money this 
week is determined  only by the public  demand  for money at the current 
funds rate, since banks' supply schedule for money is infinitely  elastic 
at this funds rate.48 
At the beginning  of the statement  week individual  banks  are  interested 
in forecasting  the federal  funds rate  in the last portion  of the week. They 
could  profit  from  being  able to predict,  say, an increase  in the funds  rate, 
since they average  their  reserves  over the week in fulfilling  their  reserve 
requirements  and they could plan  to hold required  reserves early in the 
week and lend reserves later. But early in the statement week these 
banks know neither the position of the demand curve for aggregate 
reserves nor the position of the supply curve for aggregate  reserves at 
the end of the week. The position of the demand  curve is uncertain  in 
part  because, while each bank  knows its own deposits, it does not know 
the aggregate  deposits  from  two weeks earlier  against  which  the banking 
system must hold reserves this week. The position of the supply  curve 
is unknown, even though banks may have some idea about its slope, 
because  they do not know this week's aggregate  nonborrowed  reserves. 
The  announcement  of the money stock  from  two weeks earlier,  which 
48. Robert L.  Hetzel, "The October 1979 Regime of Monetary  Control and the 
Behavior of the Money Supply in 1980," Journal of Money,  Credit and Banking, vol.  14 
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occurs in the middle of the statement  week, then carries information 
about  aggregate  required  reserves  and  the  position  of the  reserve  demand 
curve for the remainder  of the statement  week. If the money stock in 
any week is determined  by demand,  the money surprise  this week is a 
surprise  only about the demand  for money two weeks earlier,  and not 
about the supply  of money at that time. But the money surprise  carries 
information  about the current supply curve for reserves. Since the 
federal  funds rate  is observed continually,  the height  of the intersection 
of current reserve demand and supply curves is known before the 
announcement,  and  thus  information  about  one curve  is also information 
about the other. A similar point was made by Nichols,  Small, and 
Webster  in the context of a rather  different  model.49 
It is hard  to be more precise about the behavior  of the federal  funds 
rate over the statement week  without becoming involved in more 
intricacies than are appropriate  for this paper. A properly specified 
rational  expectations  model of the federal  funds  market  (and  the market 
is one for which rational  expectations seem most appropriate)  would 
have to provide detailed sources of information  unfolding over the 
statement  week: for example, the level of reserves from a week ago, 
announced  on Friday.  The model  would  also have to take account  of the 
role of the federal funds rate in aggregating  the private information  of 
individual  banks  about  their  own reserve requirements. 
We think, though, that this discussion lends plausibility  to several 
important  points. First, the rise in the funds  rate  in response  to a positive 
money surprise provides no evidence that a decision of the Federal 
Reserve  to increase  reserves  will raise  short-term  interest  rates. Second, 
the money surprise  is information  both that the demand  for money two 
weeks ago was higher than expected and that Federal Reserve policy 
is now more expansionary  than expected. Third, the increase in the 
funds rate may reflect nothing more than an expected scramble for 
reserves  at the end of the statement  week. Finally,  the funds  rate  should 
follow an approximate  random  walk over the statement week. If the 
funds rate deviated systematically  from a random  walk, for example, if 
it were persistently higher on any day of the week, then fewer banks 
would  want  to hold  reserves  on that  day. Since  aggregate  reserves  cannot 
be reduced  (except to the extent that the banking  system borrows  less 
49. See Nichols, Small,  and  Webster,  "Why  Interest  Rates  Rise." 212  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
at the discount  window), such a situation  cannot  be an equilibrium.50  If 
the funds rate is indeed a random  walk, information  received on Friday 
that the rate will be higher  on Wednesday should cause it to increase 
immediately. 
Examination  of the federal  funds rate on a daily basis from January 
1977 to February 1983 leads to some doubt about the random walk 
hypothesis. If we partition  the sample  into three  parts, with the central 
subsample  running  from  October  1979  to May 1982,  we observe changes 
in the behavior  of the funds market.  Over  the central  subsample  there  is 
a strong tendency for lagged changes in yields to have a significantly 
positive effect on subsequent  changes  within  the same statement  week. 
This effect is less marked  in the end subsamples.  Furthermore,  over an 
eighteen-month  period  beginning  in October 1979  the sample  means on 
individual  days of the week differed  significantly  and by as much as 80 
basis points. The funds rate tended to be high on Fridays and low on 
Wednesdays.51 
This evidence against the random-walk  character  of the funds rate 
may arise from the fact that the period immediately  following October 
1979  was a learning  period in which the behavior  of the funds rate was 
not well established; or it may be that some consideration  of risk is 
essential to the model. 
The behavior  of forward  interest rates is far more difficult  to model 
convincingly  than is the behavior  of the funds rate. There  are too many 
possible explanations  of the response  to money announcements  for any 
of them to be compelling.52  The temptation,  of course, is to interpret  the 
behavior  of forward  rates by using the expectations theory of the term 
structure.  For example, Nichols, Small, and Webster  observed that a 
50. This  argument  does not depend  on lagged  reserve  accounting. 
51. The behavior  of the funds rate also suggests that changes have been made in 
Federal  Reserve policy during  the period. For example, the standard  deviation  of rate 
changes  from  Friday  to Monday  rises from  0.085 in the earliest  subsample  to 0.695  in the 
central  sample  and  falls once again  to 0.242  in the most recent  period.  This  would  suggest 
that interest  rate intervention  has been restored  after  an experimental  period  of reserve 
targeting.  Our  analysis  of the money-announcement  effect on the funds  rate is based on 
the assumption  of reserve  targeting. 
52. These explanations  include  the expected inflation  effect, as in Cornell,  "Money 
Supply Announcements";  the liquidity  effect, in Nichols, Small, and Webster, "Why 
Interest Rates Rise"; an eclectic combination  of the two, in Hardouvelis, "Market 
Perceptions";  and  changes  in risk  premiums  caused  by uncertainty  about  Federal  Reserve 
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money-stock  innovation  may carry  information  about  both demand  and 
supply  shocks and claimed  that  the effects on longer-term  interest  rates 
depend  on the relative  persistence of these shocks. However, we have 
seen that the simple expectations  theory of the term structure  is really 
of no value. 
Many people have suspected that the movement  of forward  rates is 
determined  in another  way-namely,  by market  overreaction  to money- 
stock surprises.  There may be no good reason  for distant  forward  rates 
to respond  to money surprises,  and they may respond  just because the 
market  habitually  moves forward  rates in tandem  with the funds rate. 
This would be an example of the tail-wags-dog  theory discussed at the 
beginning  of this paper. 
Tests can be conducted, as noted above, to check whether market 
overreaction  has occurred  in our sample  period;  such tests are reported 
in table  7. The market  has overreacted  if the response  of the interest  rate 
to a money-stock  surprise  is offset later, that  is, if the interest  rate  tends 
to return  to its previous  level. There  are two main  types of regression  in 
table 7. Rows 2 through  4 project  changes in forward  or spot rates over 
a  week on the  preceding  money  surprise.  The  expectations  theory  implies 
that changes in forward  rates should not be predictable  on the basis of 
lagged  information;  this should also be approximately  true for changes 
in spot rates measured  over short intervals. Rows 5 through  7 regress 
realized  forecast errors  on the last money surprise  known  to the market 
at the time  the forecast  was made.  The  expectations  theory  implies,  once 
again,  that  such  forecast  errors  are  unpredictable.  The regression  of row 
1 of table 7 tests whether the federal funds rate response to a money 
surprise  is reversed by the end of the statement  week, that is, whether 
thc funds rate is a random  walk with respect to the information  in the 
money-stock  surprise.53 
It should not be surprising  that, as previously  described,  these tests 
offer low power and negligible results. Perhaps most curious is the 
regression  in row 5, which implies that, if anything,  the market  under- 
reacts  to the information  in the money  announcement.  That  is, while the 
53. In contrast  to the other tables, the t-statistics  (not the standard  errors)  appear  in 
parentheses.  Standard  errors  are  not  reported  since  the  dependent  variable  follows  a  fourth 
order, moving-average  process. However, because the regression  can be reversed to 
eliminate  serial  correlation,  the t-statistic  correctly  indicates  the presence  or absence  of a 
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Table 7.  Regression  of Forecast Errors on Previous Money-Stock  Surprises 
Longest  weekly sample  in period, February  1980  to February  1983a 
Coefficient 
of 
Dependent  Number  of  money-stock 
variable  observations  Constant  surprise  R2 
AFF,  132  -20.01  2.98  0.003 
(-1.75)  (0.61) 
AR(3)  124  -8.42  0.21  0.000 
(-1.71)  (0. I0) 
AiF(3,3)  124  -11.78  -  3.09  0.013 
(-2.03)  (-1.25) 
AR(6)  124  -9.04  -1.16  0.003 
(-2.11)  (-0.64) 
RI+3 -  Ft  110  -223.75  26.63  0.034 
(-6.85)  (1.95) 
RI6-  Ft  103  -  149.35  14.23  0.008 
(-4.15)  (0.91) 
R(1+12  -  R  88  10.02  -  12.21  0.006 
(0.23)  (-0.71) 
Source:  Authors'  calculations. 
a. Data  are for the period  from 1980  (eighth  week) to 1983  (fourth  week). The variable  AFF,  is the change  in the 
federal  funds rate between  the day after the money-stock  announcement  and the last day of the statement  week. 
ARi3),  AFi3,3), and  ARi6)  are the changes  in these variables  between  the day after  the money  announcement  and  the 
day  of the following  money  announcement.  The expression  R() j -  F(iJ1 is the  j month  rate  j months  after  the money 
announcement  minus  its forecast  in the forward  rate on the day after the money announcement.  The numbers  in 
parentheses  are t-statistics. 
three-month  ahead, three-month  forward  rate rises by 8.8 basis points 
immediately  following a $1 billion money-stock surprise, the three- 
month spot rate prevailing  three months  from now will rise by another 
26.6 basis points according to our results.54  However, given the low 
significance  and conflicting  signs of the coefficients  in the other  tests of 
table  7, we do not wish to exaggerate  the importance  of this regression. 
Although  we have not had much success in explaining  the response 
of longer-term  interest rates to money innovations,  we still have priors 
on the impact effect of a Federal Reserve decision to ease monetary 
policy by increasing nonborrowed  reserves and holding them at the 
higher level until the end of the statement  week, without announcing 
54. Thus note that tables 6 and 7 together  yield estimates  of the response  of interest 
rates to a lagged  money surprise.  Conrad  performed  a regression  similar  to that  of row 5 
of table  7 as well as analogous  regressions  for shorter  maturities  and  horizons  (down  to n 
and  m of one week). He concluded  as we did that, while  the coefficients  are  not generally 
significant,  the market  appeared  to underreact  to the announcement.  See William  Conrad, 
"Treasury  Bill Market  Response to Money Stock Announcements  before and after the 
Change  in Federal  Reserve Operating  Procedures"  (Board  of Governors  of the Federal 
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any policy change. For this purpose  we do not need a complete theory 
of the determination  of interest rates. We know enough about the 
institutions  of the federal funds market  to realize that the funds rate 
would  fall by the end of the statement  week. 
One  might  think  that  this  predictable  policy effect on the  federal  funds 
rate  would lead to a predictable  effect on the long-term  interest  rate. It 
is consistent with both the expectations theory and the tail-wags-dog 
theory  to say that  the market  predictably  communicates  a portion  of the 
change  in  the  funds  rate  to the long-term  rate.  In  fact, a weekly regression 
(from  January  1977  to July 1983,  using 266 observations)  of the change 
from Friday to Monday in the thirty-year  Treasury  bond yield on the 
change from Friday to Monday in the federal funds rate had an R2 of 
only 0.08. Many  other  factors besides the funds rate influence  the long- 
term  rate, so that even overnight  there is virtually  no relation  between 
the two. Without  knowing  the overnight  effect on the long-term  rate, it 
is harder  yet to specify the longer-run  impact. 
Conclusions 
Economics, the saying goes, consists of theories that are not borne 
out by the data and of observed empirical  regularities  for which there  is 
no theory. This saying must refer  only to simple  theories  because there 
is always an abundance  of complicated  theories  to fit any given data  set. 
A pessimist might say that our paper is further confirmation  of this 
epigram.  The simple theory that the slope of the term structure  can be 
used to forecast  the direction  of future  changes  in the interest  rate  seems 
worthless. Of course, some version of the expectations  theory  ought  to 
appear in the data if the Federal Reserve were to create a large and 
predictable  pattern  of short-term  rates. We merely  claim  that  the theory 
is useless for interpreting  the data provided  by recent history and that 
forecasting  interest rates using the slope of the term structure  will only 
be successful if there is a break  in the historical  interest  rate  pattern.55 
55. This  conclusion  stands  in  contrast  to Hansen  and  Sargent,  who  note:  "for  purposes 
of unconditional  forecasting,  it may be wise to use a vector moving  average  constrained 
by even a false null hypothesis that economizes on the number  of parameters  to be 
estimated.  In this sense, the [simple  expectations]  model-constrained  results  . . . could  be 
useful  for forecasting  even if one respects  the evidence  which  our  procedures  have  turned 
up against  the term  structure  restrictions."  (Hansen  and  Sargent,  "Exact  Linear  Rational 
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We postulated  a simple  alternative  to the expectations  theory, a tail- 
wags-dog theory, which asserts that long-term  interest rates tend to 
overreact to current information.  Although we did not construct an 
explicit theory, we did perform  some regressions  that do not appear  to 
support  such a theory. We still think that some psychological theory 
may be superior  to the simple  expectations  theory. 
We have also seen that the expectations theory can be partially 
salvaged  if plausible  measures  of time-varying  risk premiums  are intro- 
duced.  This  modification  of the  expectations  theory  must  explain  changes 
in the slope of the term structure  primarily  by changes in the risk 
premium.  Our risk measures include a moving standard  deviation of 
short-term  rates and a variable  representing  relative  volumes issued of 
different  maturities.  The problem is that such risk proxies are rather 
arbitrary  and achieve only a small  improvement  in the predictive  power 
of the expectations  theory. Alternatively,  the expectations  theory  could 
be useful in explaining  very short-run  changes in the term structure  if 
risk  premiums  are slow-moving,  but  we have no evidence that  this is the 
case. 
The phenomenon that we documented here with the use of new 
linearized  expressions-that forward  rates several years out respond  to 
money-stock  surprises-is  an empirical  regularity  for which  theories  are 
potentially too numerous (though  we think there is a single plausible 
explanation  for the response of the federal  funds rate). The traditional 
Keynesian theory of interest rate determination  is one possible frame- 
work within which the money-announcement  effect can be explained, 
and the theory is not discredited  by this effect. In fact, we believe that 
the authors  who argue  that  the money-announcement  effect is a paradox 
for which it is hard  to find  an explanation  overrate  the phenomenon.  The 
low R2 in the regression  indicates  that the market  responds  in different 
ways on different days to the same money surprise, but responds 
positively to a surprise slightly more often. One can make up many 
different  stories  that  might  explain  this behavior.  We tested whether  the 
response of forward  interest  rates was rational,  although  such tests are 
inherently weak. We found in testing one tail-wags-dog  theory with 
three- and six-month Treasury  bill rates that the market, if anything, 
underreacted  to surprises. 
Despite our skepticism, the analysis helps to interpret  the recent 
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explain  why the long-term  rate is more closely aligned  with the short- 
term  rate than  it was in earlier  years. At times when the short-term  rate 
has recently risen, observers who are unaware  of this change may be 
misled  into thinking  that the long-term  rate  is too high. Even correcting 
for this, long-term  bond  rates have been unusually  high  in the past three 
years. Increases in risk premiums  probably  account for a substantial 
part of this increase. Thus if one wished to maximize  expected short- 
term return  on investment  without regard  for risk, our results suggest 
that  long-term  bonds  would  currently  be preferable  to short-term  bonds. Comments 
and Discussion 
Laurence Weiss: A question on a recent Chicago  money-core exami- 
nation  was "Give two reasons  why a positive money surprise  announce- 
ment  will raise  interest  rates. Give two reasons  why it will lower  interest 
rates.  " The correct  answer  sorts  out two sets of issues. First,  at a specific 
point in time does an increase in money lower interest rates through  a 
Keynesian  liquidity  preference  channel  or does it raise nominal  interest 
rates to accommodate  the ensuing  inflation  through  the Fischer effect? 
Second, does a positive monetary surprise indicate an increase or a 
decrease in future  money demand  relative  to money supply?  Combining 
the two theoretical models with the two possible Federal Reserve 
reaction  functions  yields the desired  four  possibilities. 
This paper by Shiller, Campbell,  and Schoenholtz cuts in half the 
number  of possibilities  that  are  empirically  relevant;  they establish  with 
reasonable  certainty  that  an announcement  of a positive money surprise 
raises current  nominal  rates of all debt maturities.  Furthermore,  they 
estimate that a surprise  money announcement  raises implicit  forward 
future short-term  rates over time horizons up to seven years. They are 
hesitant to go further  and leave it to the reader to interpret  what the 
results imply about the validity of existing monetary theories or the 
conduct of Federal Reserve policy. They also fail to deliver on their 
implicit promise of analyzing what, if anything, changed in October 
1979. 
The data these authors  utilize is rich in its possibilities  to distinguish 
among  alternative  theories. Here is a piece of "news" that  is as clear  as 
possible in a nonexperimental  context;  it is quantifiable,  regularly  timed, 
and  related  to direct  expectational  data.  Tracing  the  comovements  among 
such news and current and future interest rates, money, and prices 
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would be revealing  in a number  of ways. This paper  goes a step in that 
direction,  but there are better  techniques  for characterizing  these inter- 
actions. Unrestricted vector autoregressions, which utilize both the 
actual  and predicted  money stock and actual interest rates, are ideally 
suited  to answering  the question  of how money  surprises  affect  the "best 
guesses" of future  variables.  If the authors  believe in a particular  theory 
linking  the current  term structure  to future  short-term  rates, this could 
be imposed as rather complicated cross-equation  restrictions on the 
vector autoregressions. I believe, however, both on the basis of the 
reported  results and unpublished  work by my colleague Lars Hansen, 
that such restrictions  would be overwhelmingly  rejected  by data. I do 
not pretend to have an explanation for this rejection, but would be 
reluctant  to rely too heavily on statistical  inferences from theories so 
obviously at odds with the data. Hence I would generally  prefer  to see 
the results  from  unrestricted  autoregressions. 
Nevertheless, despite my reservations  about  the authors'  methodol- 
ogy, I tend to believe their  results have a bearing  on the implications  of 
surprise  money announcements  for future  nominal  rates. Robert  Litter- 
man  has  informed  me that  post-October  1979  money  innovations-which 
are not quite the same as surprises,  but which are likely to be closely 
related-have a positive contemporaneous  correlation  with  nominal  rate 
innovations  and lead to a persistent  positive effect on future  short-term 
rates, reaching  a maximum  for the Federal Reserve funds rate about 
eight weeks ahead. Furthermore,  this is  consistent with a Federal 
Reserve reaction  policy that  constrains  future  nominal  money  growth  to 
be consistent with longer-run  monetary  targets;  future money growth 
rates respond  negatively  to money innovations.  In addition,  both these 
findings  appear  to be sensitive to the selected time period. In the pre- 
October 1979  period, money-supply  innovations  had a much less pro- 
nounced relation to either current or future nominal rates or future 
nominal  money. Hence there  is evidence to corroborate  that  the Federal 
Reserve did, in fact, change  its operating  procedure  in October  1979. 
What  is less clear, however, is whether  any of this has implications 
for real economic activity. In short, I would like to see if money-supply 
announcement  surprises  have any effect on the expected real rate, as 
opposed to  nominal rates. I realize that there are significant data 
limitations for linking up nominal rates and prices over short time- 
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closely related  to changes  in the short-run  interest  rate. For example, in 
Litterman-Weiss  it is shown that, although  there  is a significant  positive 
relation  between money and nominal  interest  rate innovations,  there is 
also  a strongly  negative  relation  between  money  and  expected  real  rates.  1 
This arises because of the strongly  positive correlation  between money 
and expected inflation  innovations,  even for forecast horizons  as short 
as a month.  These findings  appeared  to be surprisingly  consistent  across 
the several samples studied. Thus there is ample evidence to suggest 
that  interest  rates  respond  to money  announcements  because such news 
is relevant  for predicting  subsequent  inflation. 
I do not know if this result is sensitive to the October 1979  break. In 
general,  I am skeptical  about  treating  announcements  of policy changes 
as structural  breaks. As far as I can determine,  there were not any new 
scientific  advances about the conduct of monetary  policy at that time, 
nor were there any obvious changes in the incentive structure of 
policymakers.  There was heightened  apprehension  during  this period, 
however, about the level of current  and future  inflation  rates. Hence I 
believe policy responds to anticipations  of future events more than it 
alters what actually happens. Granted  this is a difficult  proposition  to 
refute.  The data  in this  paper  could  possibly  be used to change  my views, 
but the authors  have not yet done so. 
I thought the most interesting  part of the paper was the attempt  to 
explain  the  failure  of the  pure  expectations  hypothesis-that is, to explain 
why  expected  holding-period  yields  at  a point  in  time  on bonds  of different 
maturities  are  different.  Since  the empirical  work  presented  is admittedly 
an exercise in data mining, unrestricted  vector autoregressions  would 
be a better technique for discovering  whether differences in expected 
returns  have any interesting  comovements with other economic vari- 
ables. Besides the proxies for risk  defined  in the paper,  my own favorite 
candidate  for  explaining  departures  from  the  pure  expectation  hypothesis 
would be some measure of distribution  of liquid asset holdings  across 
firms  and  households.  Although  the theoretical  model  that  underlies  this 
intuition  has yet to be formulated,  it has become clear on the basis of 
several empirical  studies of asset prices and returns  that models based 
on a "representative  agent" playing  a game against  nature  do not fare 
1. Robert B.  Litterman  and Laurence Weiss, "Money, Real Interest Rates, and 
Output:  A Reinterpretation  of Postwar  U.S. Data," Working  Paper  1077  (National  Bureau 
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very well. Such models  make  sense as an aggregative  description  only if 
agents can ensure against individual  specific risks completely. When 
this  is not  viable,  because  of the  usual  moral  hazard  and  adverse  selection 
considerations,  agents utilize financial  assets for intermediating  trade. 
This implies that agents differ in their tolerance for different  kinds of 
risk. This type of cross-sectional  heterogeneity  may not be captured  by 
the usual aggregate.  I have no direct evidence that such heterogeneity 
can explain  the term  structure.  But I suspect that  it is a more  promising 
approach  than theories of partial  rationality  or other mysticism about 
which these authors  make  vague rumblings. 
General Discussion 
Shiller  responded  to Weiss's questions  about the statistical  method- 
ology in the paper. He argued  that the technique in the paper, which 
used explicit expectations data and observed interest rates over the 
shortest  possible interval  around  each money announcement,  was more 
useful than vector autoregressions  for studying the effects of money 
announcements.  He also observed that, by adjusting  for the effect of 
coupon payments on effective yields and by using enough data to 
calculate  holding  period  yields explicitly, the single  equation  regression 
techniques  used in the paper  are appropriate  for testing all the implica- 
tions of the expectations  theory. 
Albert Wojnilower commented on institutional  factors that have 
affected the term structure  of interest  rates during  the period  analyzed 
in the paper.  In the early  part  of the period,  Treasury  bills were the only 
short-term  marketable  instrument  available in large quantity. Market 
participants  who wanted to buy short-term  instruments  were relatively 
disadvantaged  at that  point. As short-term  securities  have become more 
broadly  available,  one would expect their  relative  yield to rise. He also 
pointed  out that  the term  structure  of rates has differed,  even at a single 
point  in time, in the corporate  and  government  securities  markets. 
Wojnilower  expressed the belief that systematic  bias in the forecasts 
of market  participants  is not as implausible  as most economists think. 
He reported  that he had been making  interest forecasts for more than 
twenty years, that his forecast  for 1982  was the first  one for that span  of 
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predictions  that are higher  than most forecasters. However, Laurence 
Weiss observed that an ex post systematic error is not necessarily 
surprising.  A bias that could be predicted from information  readily 
available  at the time would be. Wojnilower  also thought  it unlikely  that 
the same hypothesis  about  interest  rate  forecasts  would explain  market 
behavior  over the entire period analyzed because market  participants 
themselves changed  their  hypotheses about  what  affected  interest  rates 
during  that  time. 
Benjamin  Friedman  offered two explanations  for the changing  term 
structure  of interest  rates in the past. First, a changing  structure  of term 
premiums  has been required  to equilibrate  evolving risk distributions 
associated with different securities in the market. This has occurred 
because of both an evolution in market participants'  subjective risk 
assessment  and  changes  in the  objective  environment  determining  actual 
outcomes. Second, because  of the  heterogeneity  of preferences  of market 
participants  and constraints  that they face, the marginal  investor plays 
a crucial  role at any point in time, and the identity  of this investor has 
changed  both cyclically and secularly. In this connection, Wojnilower 
noted  the importance  of the tax situation  of the marginal  investor,  which 
varies a great deal, even month  to month, depending  on the volume of 
new issues. 
Friedman  questioned whether one would expect the federal funds 
rate to follow a random  walk. Quite apart  from consideration  of risk, 
individual  banks are large enough to possess some monopoly  power in 
the  funds  markets.  It might  be in  the  interests  of alarge  bank  to manipulate 
the funds rate so as to profit  from sympathetic  movements  of exchange 
rates or longer-term  interest  rates. Kermit  Schoenholtz  responded  that 
manipulation  of  the funds rate could not be  successful if it were 
predictable  and thus would not violate the random-walk  hypothesis. 
Wojnilower  said that, although  he did not know whether  attempts  are 
made  to move the funds rate, he had seen market  participants  attribute 
unusual funds rate movements to  manipulation  by others. William 
Brainard observed that the random walk used to  characterize the 
behavior  of the federal  funds rate over the week should  allow for drift. 
He noted that  banks  holding  their  required  reserves at the end of a week 
rather than at the beginning postpone the loss of interest on these 
reserves, so that there should be an upward  drift  in the funds rate over 
the week to equilibrate  the markets. 
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fundamental  had changed in October 1979. The main change at about 
that date was the identity of the Federal Reserve chairman  as well as 
Federal  Reserve policies with respect to targeting  the money supply. In 
view of this, Friedman was surprised  that anyone would doubt the 
existence of a major  change  in the regime  at that  time. Weiss responded 
that market participants  foresaw the eventual unraveling  of the new 
policy, so what happened  on that date was neither  very influential  nor 
very exciting. Wojnilower  pointed out that the market "foresaw" the 
unraveling  of policy several times. The difficulty  is that the unraveling 
did not occur until  after  it had  been predicted  several  times. Once it did 
occur it probably  led to a greater change of practice and intensity of 
interest  rate  effect than  any prediction. 
Martin  Neil Baily posed a more fundamental  question. The paper 
implies  that  the Federal  Reserve has the power  to determine  the federal 
funds  rate  through  its market  activities. But the scope of those activities 
seems very small in relation  to the scale of their effects. A few billion 
dollars  of operations  seem to move the interest  rate not only across the 
country,  but  throughout  the world.  This is particularly  puzzling  in an era 
when the banking  system and the financial  system more  generally  have 
been deregulated.  In view of that, as well as the fact that there are a 
number of close substitutes for the asset controlled by the Federal 
Reserve, it is striking  that the monetary  authority  retains  its ability to 
manipulate  the federal funds market so as to control the level of the 
whole term  structure  of rates. 
William Nordhaus made a related point. He  suggested that the 
outstanding  result  in  the  paper  was the  finding  that  money-announcement 
surprises  affect forward  rates up to five to seven years in the future. 
Effects on rates that far in the future cannot be explained simply by 
referring  to the supply  of and demand  for federal  funds. There must be 
something  else happening  in addition  to the bidding  up and down of the 
funds rate so that banks can meet their weekly reserve requirements. 
John Campbell  argued that the announcements  can be interpreted  as 
surprises  not only to market  participants  but also to Federal Reserve 
officials. The Federal Reserve can be expected to respond in certain 
ways depending  on the way in which  it is surprised.  Market  participants 
will then foresee some future  path of interest  rates following  from that 
Federal  Reserve response pattern.  The problem  in attempting  to model 
this process is that theory does not suggest restrictions  on the possible 
responses. 